Project Evaluation
Summaries
Prepared by the Policy, Planning and Evaluation
Unit (PPEU)
Burundi
I. Basic Project Data
| Project Number: | BDI/87/C05 |
| Project Title: | Low-Income Housing at Kanyosha |
| UN Cooperating Agency: |
United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (UNCHS/HABITAT) |
| Sector: | Human settlements |
| Sub-Sector: | Habitat and infrastructures |
| UNCDF Budget: | US$ 1,654,243 |
| UNDP Budget: | 464,500 |
| Government Budget: | 1,991,860 |
| Contributions by Beneficiaries: | 400,000 |
| Swiss Cooperation Budget: | 2,282,000 |
| Total Budget: | 6,792,603 |
| Total Expenditures at Evaluation: | 4,239,680 |
|
Actual UNCDF Expenditures at Evaluation: |
1,230,499 |
| Date Project Approved: | June 1990 |
| Date Project Began: | July 1988 |
| Date Project Evaluated: | July 1997 |
| Type of Evaluation: | Mid-term |
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|
II.
Background
This project is part of a habitat development plan that was launched by the Government of Burundi in 1978. It is also part of an urban programme that was defined during the preparation of the Bujumbura Guiding Scheme of Land Management and Urban Development [Schéma directeur d’aménagement et d’urbanisme (SDAU)] in December 1982. The Government’s objective through these initiatives was to make decent and economical housing units available for disadvantaged social groups.
Several projects were created as a result of this policy, the objectives of which have mostly been achieved. To address the problem of the Government’s limited institutional sustainability, two structures were created that were subordinate to the Ministry of Public Works and Equipment. The first one, called Support for Social Construction and Land Management Projects [Encadrement des constructions sociales et aménagements des terrains (ECOSAT - 1987)] promoted the production of plots of developed land and housing units, with an emphasis on meeting the needs of low-income households. The Fund for the Promotion of Urban Habitat [Fonds de promotion de l’habitat urbain (FPHU - 1990)] had as its objective the short-term or medium-term financing of habitat programmes carried out by public or private developers/promoters in all of the country’s urban centres.
UNCDF, in collaboration with UNDP, gave its support to project BDI/87/C05 following an evaluation mission and a request from the Government. Although the project was approved only in 1990, it was possible to start some project activities (studies, etc.) in 1988 due to the immediate mobilization of the national budget contribution.
Beginning in October 1993, the socio-political, and economic crisis resulted in the deterioration of state security, the loss of human lives, and destruction and the looting of housing units, infrastructure and equipment. Because of this turmoil, much of the project’s impact was compromised and the ongoing programmes suspended. At the time of the evaluation, UNCDF inputs in investment and housing credit funds had been suspended for almost three years.
III. The Project
The project was designed to produce approximately 2,200 plots of land on an initial area of 106 hectares, providing credit for material for low-income households. UNCDF financed 50 % of the primary infrastructure and the topographic surveys, 50 % of the collective infrastructure, and a fixed allocation intended to provide credits for material to low-income households. The project was executed by ECOSAT and FPHU.
The development objective was to help improve the living conditions of modest-income households by providing them with housing and infrastructure, and by supporting the creation of non-agricultural income and jobs through private sector initiatives.
The immediate objectives were:
1. The creation of 2,168 plots of land at KANYOSHA on a 106-hectare site;
2. Access to housing for 1,168 modest-income households of Kanyosha;
3. The installation at the site of 10 craftsmen in housing units that can be used as workshops; and
4. The strengthening of ECOSAT’s technical and managerial capacities.
Besides the evaluation of the project, the mission reviewed the situation relating to the recovery of the credits granted to the beneficiaries and the reimbursements to FPHU, as well as the impact of the crisis on ECOSAT’s finances. Another task of the mission was to formulate strategies that would give ECOSAT long-term viability and propose relevant recommendations on the allocation of the funds recovered.
IV. Findings of the Evaluation Mission
The impact of the project can be measured by the effective utilization of its products. By October 1993 all the assigned plots of land had been built on and occupied or about to be occupied. The opening of the school on schedule is another indicator of the project’s impact. Unfortunately, the enthusiasm created among the people by this land development was weakened by the crisis. The risk taken by a good many households in occupying their housing units through the turmoil is evidence of their attachment to their new neighbourhood.
A. Assessment of results achieved
The production of infrastructure, the provision of equipment, the organization of the plots of land, the financial assistance and the training of the beneficiaries to construct their own housing units were all notable project successes. The rigorous process followed in the call for bids, in the selection of the persons who were assigned housing units and in the establishment of credits, plots of land and construction materials strengthened ECOSAT’s credibility. The results of the socio-economic survey show that the project succeeded in reaching those strata of the population whose income is between the 20th and 60th percentiles of the income scale at Bujumbura.
Several aspects of the project, including feeder roads, drainage, piped drinking water and electrical energy have improved the living conditions of the households residing on the site. The quality and standards of the infrastructure and the equipment installed are of a very high level for this type of land development. By allocating 43 % of the plots of land to female heads of household, the project helped to improve the status of women in Burundi. Apart from the disagreement over mandates between FPHU and ECOSAT and the small number of plots of land of a highly social type, the operation remains pertinent and viable in the short term. This is true in view of its design quality and the usefulness of its products (physical achievements, procedures and institutions).
However, the evaluation mission determined that had the quality of outputs been slightly reduced, savings could have led to more housing. The communities would have benefited even more had the collection of household refuse and the clearing of road gutters been implemented as originally planned in the project document. In addition, a health centre should have been built, and the network of piped drinking water should have been extended to a wider area.
The failure to
carry out stage 4 and the present poor financial situation of ECOSAT
cannot be attributed to the project, since all of this resulted from
the crisis
,
which affected the entire country. However, when added to other difficulties
encountered during the execution of the project, these items raise the
fundamental issue of the operation’s long-term viability. In spite of
the partners’ demonstrated ability to deal with difficulties, unless
appropriate solutions are found for the problems listed below, the possibility
of replicating the operation is doubtful. The problems relate, in particular,
to:
• The excessive cost of the expropriations;
• The high cost of housing credit;
• The failure to recover certain land-management costs;
• The billing of the cost of the entire water network to the operation; and
• The weak system of recovering investment costs.
The poor financial situation of ECOSAT and the conflict between ECOSAT and FPHU, its principal donor, have created a serious impediment to project success. The conflict is unnecessary as the resources involved do not belong to either of the two institutions but to the Government of Burundi. Moreover, the two institutions have not yet fully complied with the agreements made with the donors. On the one hand, FPHU has not repaid the proceeds of the collection of UNCDF funds to the Government, whereas reimbursements were made to it by ECOSAT until 1995. On the other hand, ECOSAT has taken it upon itself since 1995 to retain part of these resources in order to keep itself above water.
The real problems now faced in project are: i) the destruction and looting of property; ii) the unequal distribution to modest-income households; and iii) the shortcomings of the system for recovering the cost of operations.
B. Assessment of project design
As previously mentioned, the operation has suffered from the confusion that exists between FPHU and ECOSAT with regard to responsibility for the “distribution and recovery of credit” in the long term for access to land and real-estate. This confusion has created a situation of statutory competition between the two institutions.
The financial arrangement for the operation presents the following fundamental problems:
• Failure to
recover equipment costs (school and market) and part of the primary
infrastructures (50 %) brings into question the replicability of this
operation. The same is true of the billing of the cost of the water
network by REGIDESO.
• The constraint imposed on ECOSAT not to charge interest on delayed payments, whereas ECOSAT is receiving the opposite treatment for all its financial commitments to FPHU, has led to a situation whereby the social cost of the operation is borne by only one participant in the arrangement.
• The sale on credit of residential and commercial plots of land reduces the availability of credit for modest-income households, which is the principal objective of the operation and would make the process of cost recovery more flexible.
• The interest rate of 13.5 % is too high.
V. Recommendations
Many recommendations
appear in the report under the following chapters: (1) restoration of
destroyed property; (2) the rehabilitation of ECOSAT; (3) the resources
of FPHU; and (4) the possibility of replicating the operation and the
viability of the sector. The following summarizes the highlights of
these chapters:
Restoration of destroyed property
The full restoration of project property destroyed during the turmoil will require three important actions: the design, financing and implementation of a project for the restoration of the physical property; its allocation to new owners; and the settlement of the financial dispute between ECOSAT and FPHU.
Rehabilitation of ECOSAT
The Government should provide ECOSAT with enough capital to enable it to restart activities and to fulfill its land development role. The necessary capital needed to adequately perform its responsibilities is estimated at 100 million Fbu.
FPHU
The Government should provide FPHU with enough long-term resources and grant it de facto all the prerogatives of a credit institution. This will enable FPHU to more effectively perform its mission.
Possibility of replicating the operation and viability of the sector
The possibility of replicating the operation is contingent upon the existence of the two institutions responsible for low-income housing (ECOSAT and FPHU). The key issue for future operations is the rotation of capital. The public and semipublic partners must assume responsibility for their contribution to the operations and the recovery of costs, on schedule and in satisfactory conditions. The evaluation mission recommends that the following measures be taken to ensure the sustainability and replicability of this project:
• A greater involvement of the municipality and of REGIDESO;
• More concrete measures to ensure the permanent availability of resources for low-income housing;
• The establishment of an institutional framework for social-habitat operations;
• The establishment of land reserves for ECOSAT;
• The adaptation of the standards and sizes of the plots of land to the needs and incomes of the target households; and
• The resumption and continuation of assistance from the donors.
VI. Policy Implications and Lessons Learned
When financing low-income housing, a rigorous financing mechanism must be established in order to ensure the recovery of all costs; regular monitoring; and effective management. This must be done to enable a permanent availability of the funds obtained by recovering these costs. Prior measures should be taken in consultation with all the partners to exempt a site from all land taxes before the start of a project in a similar sector.
The gap between the supply of plots of land by the project and the demand shows that the population lacks an adequate supply of housing. By limiting the number of certain types of equipment and infrastructure it is possible to offer more property on the market and, to increase access, especially at a time when the excessive cost of land acquisition (expropriation) is increasing the cost price of the plots of land.
VII. Evaluation Team
The mission consisted of two consultants, Kokou C. AGBOGBE for UNCDF and André MABUSHI for the Government.
