1999 Project Evaluation Results
Prepared by the UNCDF Evaluation Unit

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I. Basic Project Data

Project Number:	BGD/77/C35
Type of Evaluation:	Ex-Post
Project Title:	The Mirpur Resettlement Project
Cooperating Organization:	Grameen Krishi Foundation (GKF)
Government Executing Agency:	Housing & Settlements Directorate (HSD)
Sector:	Human Settlement
Date Project Approved:	April 1978
Date Project Began:	October 1986
Date Project Evaluated:	May 1999
UNCDF Budget:	US$     5,197,000
UNDP Budget:	387,000
UNICEF Budget:	169,000
Gov't. Budget:	2,696,000
Total Budget:	8,449,000
UNCDF Expenditures at Evaluation:	5,197,000

 

II. Background

The Mirpur Resettlement Project (BGD/77/C35) originated in the mid-1970s, when the Government of Bangladesh (GoB), through the Housing & Settlements Directorate (HSD), sought to remove some 2,600 households who were squatting on land belonging to the Ministry of Defence in Bashantek. In 1976, the GoB requested UNCDF to assist in the resettlement of these families to an 87-acre site in Mirpur allocated for this purpose. The project was initially approved by UNCDF in 1978. After significant delay caused by a range of extraneous factors, especially the flooding of the site that required earthworks for protection, the project finally started in October 1986 and was completed in December 1992. A grant that eventually totalled $5,197,000 was provided by UNCDF, with additional funding from the GoB ($2,696,000), UNICEF ($169,000) and UNDP ($387,000).

III. The Project

The immediate objectives of the Mirpur project, were three-fold and reflect actions at three distinct levels (project, strategic and policy):

• Project Level: To resettle 2,600 families in a viable community that provided adequate services and levels of physical and social security.
  
• Strategic Level: To test a Government strategy enabling very low income groups in Dhaka to have access to land tenure, urban services and housing.
  
• Policy Level: To strengthen the Government’s institutional capacity in the field of social housing.

The project design was for a classic site-and-services scheme, in which the principles of self-help housing were used to provide a basis for the sustainable improvement of people’s housing needs and conditions. International experience with such schemes is mixed, with success usually dependent upon a suitable location, security of tenure, good infrastructure and services and the active compliance of the families being moved.

IV. Findings

The main findings of the evaluation are:

• The self-help housing model, based around a site-and-services scheme, was successful in terms of providing a cost-effective means for providing a more secure and better living environment for the families relocated from Bashantek.
  
• The success reflected the good location, infrastructure provision and security of tenure that characterised the scheme.
  
• This process was based on a good organisational structure that integrated government agencies, NGOs and the community. This includes confidence that the initial registration and allocation of plots was fair and transparent.
  
• It has led to sustainable livelihood improvements, with both increased incomes and a major growth in the assets owned by the Baunia residents.
  
• There is a process of gentrification taking place, with an active land market developing and plots being sold to outsiders.
  
• The main problems centre on the land registration system. Due to a break-down in the repayment process within the Government, there were serious concerns over whether some sections of the population will be allowed to pay the full dues and therefore receive full title to their plot.
  
• The project design was inherently flawed, with an over-concentration on the physical development of the resettlement estate and no meaningful attempt to integrate activities that corresponded to project objectives on the development and institutionalisation of low-income housing policies and strategies. The component relating to the first objective, the resettlement of 2,600 households from Bashantek to Mirpur, was very good, with an approach to resettlement that was appropriate and effective. The design faults relate to the second two objectives, concerned with the development and institutionalisation of strategies and policies for low-income housing. The project contained no meaningful components to realise these objectives and also failed to include an effective monitoring and evaluation process that would have addressed these failings during the project’s lifetime.
  
• The consequence is that the project had no impact on national or Dhaka housing development strategies or policies which currently concentrate on high-rise developments that are not accessible to the poor, and punitive demolition and eviction actions against squatter dwellers. This represents a missed opportunity, for the Mirpur model provides the basis for a sustainable and effective strategy addressing the living environment and livelihood development needs of the urban poor.

V. Results/Impact

The project has resulted in an area that is now a thriving and developing neighbourhood that is characterised by significant improvements to the livelihoods of its residents with expanding infrastructure and housing stock. There are some areas for concern; in particular, the issue of land registration and provision of land titles require closer examination. Despite this, it is clear that the first project objective has unequivocally been met. The evaluation concluded that this was a community that was transforming itself from one of the most underprivileged in the city to one where life was improving and where the future could be viewed with optimism. It is clear that the concept of self-help housing and development that was the rationale behind the project was realised. This experience provides important lessons for improving the position of the poor living in urban slums.

Attainment of the second objective is difficult to assess. At one level it has been met, in that the strategy was tested and proved successful in Baunia. This experience has the potential to serve as a model for wider replication that could form the basis, in part at least, for the resolution of the housing and development problems that the urban poor in Bangladesh face. A matter of serious concern is that there has not existed any form of process whereby these elements of a strategy could be translated into a model that could be applied on a wider basis.

The attainment of the last objective is less ambivalent. No action was taken to strengthen institutional capacities during or after the project. There is no evidence to suggest that the experiences gained during the Mirpur Resettlement Project have in any way informed the policy approach to low-income urban housing. Indeed, all the evidence points the other way, with development approaches concentrating on high-rise housing for the middle classes and a programme of punitive slum demolitions and evictions underway at the time of the evaluation.

VI. Recommendations

Based on these conclusions, the main recommendations of the evaluation team are:

1. There is a need for action to ensure that the final stages of the land registration and transfer process are successfully completed. The present system and institutional capacities available are not adequate for this task and residents are suspicious of the role played by HSD staff. It is consequently recommended that:
   • The rules concerning instalment payments and final registration are clarified and widely publicised in the settlement.
     
   • Greater capacity to collect outstanding dues and complete the title transfers is needed. This also needs to be seen to be fair and transparent. It is consequently recommended that an NGO, if possible CONCERN, be contracted to complete this task, and that an external verification of this process takes place.
2. There is a danger that the positive experience from Baunia will be lost at a time when Bangladesh is in a critical need for sustainable solutions to the low-income housing crisis. The following steps will help to address this issue:
   • The success of the Mirpur model should be more widely publicised: not just within the institutions directly involved in its implementation, but also in the wider public domain so that other institutions with an interest in this area are made aware of the results.
     
   • The scope for additional support to the sector should be carefully examined, but any such support should be linked to clear conditions and, in particular, should be contingent upon a demonstrated commitment to enhance institutional capacities, initiate policy and legislative reforms and allocate adequate and appropriate lands for such policies.
3. The process of project design, implementation and evaluation needs to be carefully examined, to ensure that:
   • There is an appropriate relationship between goals, objectives, activities and outputs.
     
   • The structure and duration of the project reflects the full development process with which it is concerned (and not just the period of donor funding).
     
   • There is a clear and appropriate designation of institutional responsibilities for all aspects of the project.
     
   • Adequate internal and external monitoring and evaluation processes are integral to the project.

VII. Lessons Learned

The key lessons to be learned from the Mirpur Resettlement Project are:

1. Good project design is fundamental to the success of any such process. This design should ensure that the project -
   
   • Is conceptually sound, with all aspects of the development process integrated into the basic model.
     
   • Has an appropriate range of activities for all objectives, including those that relate to the process through which positive experiences can be institutionalised.
     
   • Contains an effective monitoring and evaluation process as integral to the project.
     
   • Is or a duration that covers the full process, not just the component where donor funds are disbursed.
     
2. The institutional modalities of such projects are of critical importance, with much of the success in Baunia reflecting good initial arrangements and current concerns over land registration and transfers reflecting problems at this level.
   
3. Participatory self-help works: the urban poor are willing and able to rapidly improve both their living environment and their livelihood prospects when given minimal levels of security and reasonable access to opportunities and factors of productions such as credit and markets.
   
4. The concentration on immediate implementation tasks such as land preparation without considering the wider development context of the project is self-defeating. In this case, this relates in particular to the creation of a process that would allow the institutionalization of the Mirpur model once it proved successful.
   
5. The process of project evaluation is important in creating the conditions where these lessons could be identified. The insights presented in this report would not have been possible without the sort of in-depth field research and analysis that has characterised this evaluation, as initial impressions were extremely different to the final conclusions. Effective external evaluation is an essential complement to a good internal monitoring and evaluation system and needs to be integrated at the design stage.

VIII. Evaluation Team

The evaluation was carried out by:

• John Soussan (Team Leader)
  
• Anjan Datta
  
• Alexandra Clemett