Project Evaluation Summaries
Prepared by the Policy, Planning and Evaluation Unit (PPEU)

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Burkina Faso

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I. Basic Project Data

Project Number:	BKF/90/C01, BKF/90/014
Project Title:	Establishment of a seed multiplication and distribution network in the CRPA du Sahel
UN Cooperating Agency:	FAO
Government Executing Agency:	Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry
National Implementing Agency:	CRPA du Sahel
Sector:	Agriculture
Sub-Sector:	Genetic Resources
UNCDF Budget:	US$     (Revision "G") 1,084,126
UNDP Budget:	694,700
Gov't. Budget:	240,500
Total Budget:	2,019,326
UNCDF Expenditures at Evaluation:	634,741
Date Project Approved:	Dec 1987
Date Project Began:	Mar 1992
Date Project Evaluated:	Mar 1996
Type of Evaluation:	Final

II. Background

The agricultural sector in Burkina Faso is the primary economic activity and accounts for more than 70% of exports. The Sahelian part of Burkina Faso consists of the provinces of Soum, Oudalan and Sono, where 550,000 live, most of whom are Peuls. The chief crops are millet, sorghum and cowpeas (niébé), but livestock continues to be the main resource, as the region runs a chronic cereals deficit. Development activities in the region are under the supervision of the Centre Régional de Production Agro-pastorale (CRPA) (Regional Agro-Pastoral Production Centre) at Dori, which is subdivided into 12 Agricultural Supervision Zones (ZEA) at the local level.

The project follows on UNDP/FAO project BKF/87/018 in support of the seed programme of CRPA du Sahel, which set up the first seed-producing farm at Bani and equipped four seed centres. UNDP subsequently financed project BKF/92/T01/A/08/12, with the objective to work out a national policy for the development of the seed-producing sector.

III. The Project

The project aimed to build upon the achievements of project BKF/87/018 and extend the sphere of its influence. In order to facilitate the distribution of seeds to farmers who are attached to the resistant qualities of their traditional seeds, the 1991 formulation mission opted for seed multiplication in the rural areas, limiting the use of the State farms to the production of basic seed. It concluded that it was of fundamental importance to integrate the seed project with the agricultural extension project of CRPA-Sahel working simultaneously on other factors of production.

The project's objectives were: (1) to produce basic millet, sorghum and cowpea seed at Bani on a new site to be irrigated and provided with seed-processing equipment and infrastructure; (2) to produce 360 tons of second-generation seed per year, through a network of 300 local farmers engaged in multiplication under the supervision of five existing seed centres equipped with irrigation and seed processing plant and equipment; (3) to distribute this seed through the ZEAs to 15,000 peasants, or 25% of the farmers in the zone, thereby increasing the annual income of each farmer by approximately US$ 100; (4) to provide support for the supervision of CRPA in extension work promoting appropriate technical themes. Quality control of the seed was to be overseen by the National Seed Service (SNS). The UNCDF budget included four revolving funds totalling $202,000 to finance production, transport, processing and distribution of seed. UNDP technical assistance financed the project personnel.

The objectives of the project were revised downward following the national seed sector workshop in 1993 and the 1994 technical review mission: lowering of the target for cowpeas to 55 tons per year; reducing the number of seed centres from five to two (Bani farm and Pobé); and downsizing the storage facilities.

IV. Purpose of the Evaluation

The purpose of the final evaluation was to determine the effectiveness of the project in attaining its objectives; to review project financials and the cost of producing seed; to assess the quality and timeliness of inputs, activities and monitoring; to identify factors that impeded or facilitated the smooth conduct of activities; to assess the viability of the rural community groups; to evaluate the relevance of the project agreement and project strategy; and, lastly, to study the viability of establishing a second phase involving support for the distribution and marketing of seed by the local farmers.

V. Findings of the Evaluation Mission

A. Assessment of results achieved

The project has not fully achieved any of its original objectives due to the delay and inadequacy of infrastructure inputs, limited and expensive production of seed, and unsuitable training.

Construction and equipment:

The development of the Bani district was completed on schedule, but is far from satisfactory. The primary irrigation channel is too narrow, its slope is not steep enough, and the plots have been only roughly graded. The physical improvements constructed in the Bani district (barn, warehouse, storage yard and composting shed) were put into service only in January 1995 following numerous delays. The barn and the four warehouses at Pobé Mengao are still unfinished. Most of the equipment is in place, although it is, on the whole, ill-suited to the needs of the project, as it is inadequate (single-row seeders), inappropriate (metal carts, electric generators, packaging equipment), and expensive.

Seed production and distribution:

This activity, which started only in 1994/95, has not achieved its objectives either quantitatively or qualitatively. Production is only 10 tons per year. Only 500 kg of seed were distributed, the remainder having been sold for food consumption. The pre-base seed provided by national research (INERA) has generally been of mediocre quality, while the purchase price is prohibitive for the farmers. A local prospective study on the distribution of seed has recently been finalized.

Training and technical assistance:

This project component has been a total failure, with the exception of a few good training sessions conducted in 1995 by the national project called "Awareness-raising for peasants living in areas around dams" (irrigation management and functional literacy). Training in the marketing of seeds by INADES is expensive, unsuitable and incomplete. CRPA has not received the expected support for extension activities. After being provided with three grants for training abroad, the National Manager and Chief of the Seed Programme both left the programme upon their return from training. As planned, FAO provided, for two years, a Chief Technical Advisor (CTA), a seed specialist, and an irrigation engineer (who was a United Nations Volunteer). However, the involvement of the CTA was poorly planned since, following delays in installing infrastructure, he left the project before seed production began. Lastly, the project staff, who were poorly motivated, were seldom available to the farmers and seemed to spend more time in Ouagadougou than in Bani.

Impact:

The impact on incomes has been very weak since very little seed has been distributed. Only 63 seed producers (16 of them women) enjoyed an increase in income, ranging from CFAF 22,000 to CFAF 118,000, or an average of US$ 130 per farmer per year. This figure amounts to only 0.5% of the impact originally planned. The project's impact in terms of training and technical assistance appears to have been negligible for the reasons referred to above.

B. Assessment of project design

The mission believes that the project faithfully reflects the Government's concerns with respect to food security in the Sahelian region of Burkina Faso. It is clear that the problems of the project stemmed more from poor management than from bad planning. However, the objectives set were very ambitious, although they are no doubt achievable in the longer term. The preparation of the team and the commitment of the authorities to the proposed approach should have been further clarified and conditions should even have been laid down. In addition, the estimates on the size and amount of equipment far exceeded what was actually needed.

VI. Recommendations of the Evaluation Mission

Since the mission took place only days before the project was to end, the recommendations focus on the second phase devoted to the distribution/marketing activities, for which the mission proposes the following outline:

Phase 1, March-September 1996:

The existing staff should be reduced. The coordinator should be more involved in technical issues and the sociologist should engaged to pursue the programme activities. Training activities should be carried out by a team of three consultants, which will make it possible to upgrade the technical level of the staff and the farmers.

Phase 2, September 1996 to August 1998:

A clear strategy should be designed, calling for close cooperation between a local NGO specialized in the marketing of agricultural commodities in the Sahelian part of Burkina Faso, the CRPA-Sahel (for supervision, extension work and seed distribution), a seed technician, and UNCDF. The project would finance seed production and distribution. The NGO should be strengthened by the addition of two United Nations Volunteers (accountant and seed technical / commercial specialist). A formulation mission is needed to develop this strategy.

The mission further recommends the following actions:

• Rent or sell all oversized equipment, then purchase more appropriate equipment for harnessing draught animals and shipping and receiving equipment, and use light carts in the centres;

• Complete the construction in the Pobé warehouses; halt the construction of new warehouses in the ZEAs, redesign the secondary and tertiary channels in the Bani district, and install motorized pumps;

• Take over the project of seed production, emphasizing quality control and training; limit multiplied varieties; use composted and organic rather than chemical fertilizers;

• Train local farmers in quality control of seed on-site in the fields and in sorting of seeds; search for local outlets for seed producers while continuing seed distribution; and negotiate a floor purchase price with seed producers and payment of quality bonuses at the end of on-site inspections rather than after laboratory tests.

VII. Policy Implications and Lessons Learned

The success of seed projects depend on the prior identification of actual demand among the population concerned. Before seeking to multiply and market seed on a large scale, it would have been better to begin by identifying, in cooperation with the local farmers, varieties adapted to local conditions and to test those varieties. In general, the absence of consultation and participation with the target group negatively affected the project.

The weakness or nonexistence of specialized national institutions (for quality control, varieties research services, and extension agencies) constituted a major constraint on the project. The seeds were multiplied in public centres which did not have the necessary

training, quality, or motivation, and which did not cooperate very much with the farmers. This resulted in technical choices and the selection of seed varieties that were unsuited to local conditions and in difficulties in marketing output. The necessary linkages between research, seed-producing agencies and peasant seed-multipliers were not established. Lastly, the nonexistence of functional national coordinating machinery and legislation relating to seed is an impediment to the harmonious development of this branch of activity.

Training abroad provided under the project may prove useless if the recipients of such training are not held legally responsible for remaining with their institutions following the training.

UNCDF must be more vigilant with regard to project monitoring and evaluation. In fact, several previous internal monitoring missions identified numerous problems in the implementation and management of the project, and yet no action was taken to remedy the shortcomings.

VIII. Evaluation Team

The evaluation team consisted of Shams Gholam, seed specialist and Team Leader representing UNDP and UNCDF; and S. Assignenou, representing FAO, and Aimé Zoungrana, Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources, representing the Government.