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United Nations Capital Development Fund - Evaluations

I.   Basic Project Data

Type of Evaluation: Final
Project Number: BKF/91/C02 (BKF/95/005)
Programme Title: Boulsa-Tougouri Road Construction Project in Namentenga Province
Government Executing Agency: Ministry of Public Works,Housing and Urban Planning (Central Division of Work Inspection)
UN Cooperating Organization: UNOPS
Sector: n/a
Sub-sector: n/a
Project approval date: 2 February 1996
Project start date: 31 October 1996
Project end date: 22 August 2000
Evaluation date: February/March 2002
Project Budget
  Initial Revised
UNCDF: US$   $4,048,772 3,537,607*
UNDP: 485,128 482,830*
Government of Burkina Faso: 45,900 145,900*
Beneficiaries: n/a n/a
Total: 4,579,800 4,166,337*
Actual Expenditures
at Evaluation:
n/a

II.   Background

Burkina Faso is a landlocked country covering 274, 000 square kilometers, with an estimated population of nine million inhabitants in 1993. It has a high average density for an African country (32 inhabitants per square kilometers) . The problems due to the precarious food supply situation found in all Sahelian countries are somewhat aggravated by the high population density, especially in the central part of the country. Due to its isolation and the nature of the economic activities centered on the primary sector, the transportation sector in general, and the road infrastructure sector in particular, takes on a strategic nature for the country ’s economic development. Burkina is, in fact, not only a country without any maritime outlet (the closest port is 700kilometers away) , but also a transit country for the countries of the interior, Mali and Niger.

The province of Namentenga, situated in the central northern region and divided into six departments, covers an area of 6, 158 square kilometers (32%of the region ’s total surface area) and houses a total population of 198, 890 (27%of the region ’s total) . The province offers certain assets for agricultural development, especially in the southern departments. The soil there is less degraded and the presence of many lowlands allow better surface water control. Prior to the project, the lack of roads and hence, to many large markets, reduced the potential for distributing agricultural production. The geographic situation of the province makes it a crossroads for bringing cattle from the collection markets of the Sahel to the north to the redistribution markets or pasturelands in the south. Before the startup of the project, due to a poor quality internal road system, the province was isolated from the rest of the country for four months of the year, particularly when the demand for transportation is relatively high.

The presence of the UNCDF in the province of Namentenga goes back to 1985, the startup year for the Production Actions in Namentenga project (PAPANAM) which objective was to reduce the vulnerability of agricultural production through better water control and anti-erosion measures to protect the soil. In May 1991, the Government asked the UNCDF to develop an intervention programme in this province that would ensure the complementarity of the projects in using resources better and placing importance on the management and conservation of natural resources. It is in this context that the “Boulsa-Tougouri Road Repair ”project was formulated in October 1993. Another UNCDF project formulated at the same time was to ensure the development of the retaining reservoirs resulting from the dikes constructed as part of the work for the road connecting Boulsa and Tougouri. the following objectives:

III.   The Project

The project aims to open up the northern area of the province, which was isolated from the south during the rainy season, and to support the Government in its policy of pursuing self-sufficiency and food security, and the actions aimed at increasing incomes and the standard of living of producers and their families. Thus, the project targeted the following objectives:

Development objective

The project will contribute to achieving the development objectives of the Central- North region with respect to self-sufficiency and food security, and will support the Government in raising incomes and the standard of living of producers and their families.

Immediate objectives

  1. Improve the marketing conditions for agricultural products;
  2. Facilitate trans-regional flows;
  3. Increase the access of the populations to public services (health, education and safety) ;
  4. Facilitate travel by the provincial and regional development agents and agents of the provincial administration within the region;and
  5. Support the agro-pastoral development component of the project in the province of Namentenga (PAPNA) concerned by the development of lowlands and irrigated areas.

Outputs

Construction of a type B 82. 8-km road connecting Boulsa and Tougouri

Construction of 1, 800 linear meters of dikes-dams.

IV.   Evaluation Findings

Evaluation of the results

In accordance with expectations, an 81. 5 kilometers road connecting Boulsa and Tougouri and 1, 345 linear meters of dikes-dams in Belga, Gargo and Niounougou were constructed. Provisional acceptance was announced on July 27, 1999, and final acceptance on August 22, 2000. SATOM, selected following an international call for bids, worked diligently while producing work that conformed perfectly to the specifications.

However, the evaluation mission noted significant problems that put the sustainability of the road and its dikes-dams into question. Due to the overall under-sizing of the drainage structures, of the heights of embankments, of the dikes and the weirs, most of the road was frequently under water during the rainy season of 2001, under ordinary rainfall conditions. Specifically, these submersions caused the destruction of berms, embankments and dikes, washouts downstream of the drainage structures, premature silting of the lateral ditches, and, for two-months, burst the Niounougou dike. The damages from July 1999 was repaired for around US$100, 000 from the UNCDF funding, the government having repaired the break in the Niounougou dike during the 2001 rainy season for a similar amount.

More disturbing is the situation of the Zéguédéguin dam. Built in 1989 with funding from the Netherlands, 850 meters long and holding 8. 8 million cubic meters of water, it is one of the most important structures of this road. When the project was identified in May 1991, it was already showing signs of deterioration, endangering the durability of the work and the safety of the downstream population. The Government had com- mitted to funding the repair work for this structure, this commitment being a prior condition for the funding of the project by the UNCDF. However, these conditions were never met, while the condition of the dike deteriorated to the point that this structure is in danger of giving way before or during the next rainy season.

The causes of the damage are technical and direct, as well as institutional and indirect. The direct technical causes are:(i) the generalized under-sizing of the drainage struc- tures, of the heights of the embankments and of the dikes and weirs during the last cost adjustment phase of the project;(ii) the insufficiency of the watershed studies and of the hydrological data and (iii) the inadequacy of the geo-technical data studies and the faulty assessment of the soils for the selection of construction materials for the embankments and dikes, and the stability of the berms. The indirect institutional causes are due to technical services ’very weak use of regional expertise for the infrastructures, as well as the absence of any joint action with the local populations.

Evaluation of the project design

The project document erred in under-estimating the total cost of the construction work for the road and the other structures. A first formulation mission estimated the cost of building the road at US$6. 5 million, a cost much higher than the budget projections of the UNCDF. A second mission reformulated the project in September 1994 in order to review the technical characteristics of the road. Based on the report of this last mission, the technical study produced by the company DIWI-Consult, in collaboration with the National Laboratory of Construction and Public Works (LNBTP) , had estimated the cost at US$4. 7 million, a cost still much higher than the budgetary envelope of the UNCDF. At the UNCDF ’s request, this cost was brought down to US$3. 3 million, with savings made by reducing the embankments, the drainage works and the road signage. The mission is of the opinion that, according to trade practices, DIWI-Consult should have presented different options as well as an analysis of the risks, which was not done. The UNCDF should have thought harder about the consequences of the economies required for the viability of the road and its structures. Finally, as the repair of the Zéguédéguin dam by the government was identified in the project document as a precondition for startup of the project, the UNCDF should have deferred its own financial commitment pending the effective satisfaction of this condition.

Evaluation of Outcomes and Impact

The mission is of the opinion that the project has achieved all its immediate objectives. However, the sustainability of the results will only be achieved if the government complies with its commitment to repair the Zéguédéguin dam and assumes complete responsibility for maintaining the road and its various structures.

As the management committee that should, among other things, have handled the collection of basic data to make it possible to measure the impact of the road was never operational, the evaluation mission did not have available data to quantify the impact of the project and was only able to make observations.

The mission is of the opinion that the project has certainly achieved its socio-economic objectives. As testified by all the beneficiaries questioned (public services, NGO, populations, transportation companies) , the road has, undisputedly, permitted the opening up of the Namentenga province. A large flow of vehicles uses the road, parti- cularly on Pouytenga market days, and this flow is so large that the road has effectively become an international road. It draws traffic from all the regions of the Central North and Sahel areas, as well as handle the traffic between Togo, Ghana and the northern part of Niger. This was not foreseen. The mission noted an improving trend in health indicators in Namentenga, even though they remain low compared to other provinces. This development is attributable to the facilitation of health evacuations of patients from the departments of the central and northern areas of the province by the road. The road has also contributed to increasing revenues. The mission also noted the birth of the fishing activity in Belga and Niounougou and agro-pastoral products are now sold along the entire road on market day in Pouytenga, even in the smallest hamlets. Many small businesses have also flourished in the built up areas through which the road passes. This development benefits the entire population, especially women who have no means of transportation.

On the other hand, the defects noted in the road ’s main structure, the Zéguédéguin dam, could have a very marked negative impact. The mission feels that the collapse of this dam, which unfortunately appears inevitable if no measures are taken, could result in a loss of human life as well as a loss of more than 25, 000 head of livestock. The Government indicated that it was looking for funding from sponsors to finance the repair work.

V.   Recommendations

In order to ensure the safety of the population, the government must rehabilitate the Zéguédéguin dam before the next rainy season. In order to ensure the durability of the road and its structures, before the next rainy season, the Government must begin to improve the hydraulic capabilities of the drainage system and undertake additional reinforcement work.

To avoid duplicate services and to better monitor the work and its cost, a technical study should be conducted to closely tie the development of the PAPNA project (also funded by the UNCDF) to those of this project, and, if possible, use the same engineering firms;

To ensure economy, efficiency, optimum use of its expertise and more effective technical management, the Government should consolidate, at least at the regional level, all the infrastructure services and strengthen the National Laboratory of Construction and Public Works (LNBTB) so that it can correlate and create reliable geo-technical databases, prepare the geo-technical map of the country indicating locations, quantities and qualities of the materials and their use.

VI.   Lessons Learned

By their very nature, infrastructure serves, among other things, as a base and catalyst for the other economic sectors. Governments and sponsors have everything to gain by adopting participatory and democratic approaches for managing the basic infrastructure as an integral part, and spearhead, of dynamic community development. This approach, which has proven itself, calls on the beneficiaries and the expertise of all for the selection of the infrastructure, their design and execution, and for their funding and maintenance. This process empowers the communities, introduces good local governance and internalizes the fight against poverty for a self-managed community that succeeds in providing for its basic needs.

The involvement and participation of the populations in implementing the project would have made it possible to mitigate a large number of the technical problems encountered. Thus, the populations ’familiarity with their environment would have made it possible, for example, to mitigate the insufficiencies of the watershed studies and the hydrologic data, as the populations would have been able to provide invaluable information concerning the intensity and frequency of the rains and the previous flood levels, which would have made it possible to size the hydraulic structures correctly.

When the designers of a project identify an important pre-condition to startup of the activities, it is important that the project sponsors make sure that the pre-condition has, in fact, been satisfied before committing their funds, not only as an issue of credibility, but above all because the success or sustainability of the project depends on it.

VII.   Members of the Evaluation Team

  • Pierre Ekemba Sooh, Engineer, International Consultant, Head of Mission
  • Sibiri Ouedraogo, Socioeconomist, National Consultant