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United Nations Capital Development Fund - Evaluations

Project Evaluation Summaries
Prepared by the Policy, Planning and Evaluation Unit (PPEU)


Ethiopia

I. Basic Project Data

Project Number: (i) ETH/82/C05;
(ii) ETH/85/C02
Project Title: (i) Small Scale Irrigation
Schemes in Central Highlands;
(ii) Small Scale Irrigation
Schemes in Gamo Gofa
UN Cooperating Agency: OPS
Govt. Executing Agency: Ministry of Agriculture
Rural Infrastructure Development
(RIDMD)
Sector: Natural Resources (03)
Sub-Sector: Irrigation (0320)
(i)
UNCDF Budget: US$     1,955,000
UNDP Budget: 105,000
Gov't. Budget: 3,759,000
Total Budget: 5,819,000
Actual Total Expenditures
at Evaluation:
9,426,470
Date Project Approved: Jan 1985
Date Project Began: 1985
Date Project Evaluated: July 1993
Type of Evaluation: Final
(ii)
UNCDF Budget: US$     2,125,000
UNDP Budget: 400,000
Gov't. Budget: 4,647,500
Total Budget: 7,172,000
Actual Total Expenditures
at Evaluation:
1,786,820
Date Project Approved: Feb 1986
Date Project Began: (to begin 1994)
Date Project Evaluated: July 1993
Type of Evaluation: Final


II. Background

Ethiopia's agriculture is based almost entirely on rain-fed mixed cereal, food crop production and rearing of livestock. Irrigated agriculture represents less than 0.2% of total land surface suitable for agriculture, and small-scale irrigation accounts for less than half of this area. Yet interest in small-scale irrigation schemes in Ethiopia gained momentum during the serious droughts in the late 1970s and early 1980s because of their potential to help meet the needs for crop and food security of populations in specific, disadvantaged areas.

Originally, the Government's focus was on increasing food production of basic cereals to help local populations achieve self-sufficiency. This was to be achieved by providing new irrigation in specific areas most threatened by yield reduction, crop loss and food shortage resulting from drought and population pressure. However, the main period of project activity, from 1989 to 1993, was one of fundamental political and economic transformation in Ethiopia. The fall of the left-wing regime in early 1990- 91 not only caused major delays in project execution, but also brought about fundamental shifts in the project design as the new Transitional Government liberalized trade and markets and moved toward reducing the role of the state in the economy. Emphasis therefore shifted to a concentration on surplus production areas rather than deficit areas as a means of speeding up agricultural development and meeting the national food shortfall.


III. The Projects

ETH1821C05 - The development objective of the first and second projects was the same: to increase the production of basic food crops, particularly the principal cereals, in order to support Government efforts at achieving food self- sufficiency. The specific objectives of the first project, to be achieved over a period of seven years with funding from the African Development Bank/Fund, were as follows:

  1. To complete 7 irrigation schemes already under construction, with a projected benefit to 14,000 people, increasing agricultural production 3.4 times over 1,435 hectares of arable land.
  2. To construct new irrigation facilities for an additional 3,000-3,500 he of land, benefiting an additional 26,000 people.
  3. To strengthen Government capacity for providing technical, engineering and extension services to peasant farming communities.

Five schemes of the first project were located in the Southern/Oromiya Regions (Gewada, Argoba, Kate, Lentala, and Ketar) and four were located in the Northern/Amhara Regions (Tikur Weha, Gerai, Fetam, and Kilti).

ETH/851C02 - The objectives of the second UNCDF project, to be achieved over a period of five years with funding from the Chinese Government, ware as follows:

  1. To construct headworks, water intakes, and primary canals for two small-scale irrigation schemes in Hare and Basso, in the southern region, thereby increasing agricultural production on 1,500 he of land and improving the income and living conditions of 2,143 small farmers.
  2. To provide equipment to the Ministry of Agriculture in order to allow it to continue developing small-scale irrigation schemes within the Zonal Irrigation Unit.

By project's end it was anticipated that at least 800 he at Hare and 700 he at Basso would have been developed for irrigated agriculture. At the time of the Evaluation Report the project still had not commenced, however, due to delays in co- financing by the Chinese Government.

For both projects, UNCDF was to provide earth moving and construction equipment, spare parts, and transport vehicles, as well as a revolving credit fund for the financing of input supply for agricultural development. In the first project, UNCDF was also to finance storage facilities for farm produce. UNDP was to provide a number of short-term consultancies and the services of two UN Volunteers.


IV. Purpose of the Evaluation

The purpose of the Evaluation Mission was to assess the achievements and impact of the schemes and the problems and delays affecting progress, to appraise the performance of various institutions, and to deduce what action UNCDF should take now to improve the realization and results of investment in the projects.


V. Findings of the Evaluation Mission

A. Assessment of results achieved

ETH1821C05: The overall progress and performance of the project was consistently below target. Less than half the work targeted for construction or rehabilitation was completed; just over 60% of irrigable land was in use; and final completion was estimated to be 3 years behind schedule. However, given the political atmosphere, this was perhaps understandable.

With regard to UNCDF inputs, machinery was largely underutilized, with preference given to larger machinery over smaller, which would have been preferable in many cases. The lack of cement, fuel and spare parts was a major constraint throughout the project life, but particularly in late 1990.91.

Poor performance in rehabilitation and construction is attributed to lack of design data, delays in staff assignment, problems with equipment end materials supply (not the case with UNCDF-supplied equipment, however), periods of instability and insecurity which prevented field work from taking place, and the lack of autonomy of IDD. The disappointing uptake by farmers in irrigated areas was due in some cases to limited knowledge and appreciation of benefits of irrigation, negligence on the part of the Government regarding irrigation infrastructure upkeep, and absence of land-tenure security.

However, on-form development, demonstrations of new crops and techniques, credit provision and encouragement of better farmer participation and organization for water management were found to be satisfactory and promising for future development. While a 70% growth in use of irrigable areas and evidence of farmer enthusiasm was noted, one key constraint, i.e. project design, tended to alienate the intended beneficiaries, rather than involving them. It was also noted that there was antagonism towards the collectivized production systems, i.e. Producer Cooperatives by the rural communities which politicized their lives and reduced incentives for cooperation. Some farmers suffered from an inadequate knowledge of irrigation husbandry and its potential benefits.

ETH/851C02: The situation was at an impasse at the time of the evaluation. The Ethiopian and Chinese Governments signed an agreement in April 1993, but at the time of the Evaluation Mission, work had not commenced on either of the schemes. In fact a local NGO had begun work independently of the government-sponsored scheme on a new main canal and was in dispute with the government, which was trying to put a stop to the work.

B. Assessment of project design

Both schemes were designed to be highly mechanized under a system of collective farm production. However, the change of government, followed by privatization of land late in the project life, greatly altered the situation. The designs should have been amended to reflect these changes. Aside from these external factors, the Mission identified the following shortcomings in the original project designs:

  • Project preparation, including appraisal by UNCDF, was not sufficiently thorough to identify shortcomings in suitability and credibility of the technical and economic outcomes. In many schemes there was insufficient information about pre-project agricultural activities, socio-economic date and basic survey data end even though reports called for these problems to be remedied, little seems to have been done.

  • Overall, while of high technical level, the designs were based on incomplete, often erroneous, meteorological data, and estimates of river flow were found to be too optimistic.

  • The selection of the schemes was not in line with the usual philosophy and justification for small scale irrigation development, nor did it meet the stated objectives and parameters for the project.

  • The area and intensity of cropping under traditional irrigation were seriously underestimated.

  • The social and human dimensions of project planning were virtually absent.

  • A system for comprehensive planning, budgeting, monitoring and evaluation was absent or inadequate.


VI. Sustainability

The impact of irrigation on the individual farm household in terms of food security and incremental income is the single most important factor determining project success and sustainability, yet this information was not readily accessible due to the lack of a coherent monitoring and evaluation which the Producer Cooperatives were intended to manage. Despite the increasing interest of farmers in small scale irrigation, it was hard to gauge how well founded this new interest is; how fast it will develop, especially if the project level of support from the Government is curtailed; how long it will be sustained if more realistic cost recovery and operational charging systems are introduced by private contractors as foreseen; and how quickly the Government will enact necessary legislation to formalize recognition of cooperatives, community groups and water users associations to allow them access to credit and other services within a proper regulatory framework.

Overall the mission's conclusion is that UNCDF's irrigation development projects will prove relatively successful in due course, although results to date are poor. It is unlikely that the projects will show a positive economic rate of return and as yet there are few social, environmental or other benefits to justify the expenditure. However, the positive factors are the beginnings of an irrigation development institutional capability, experience in design and construction, facilitation of on-farm development and encouragement of farmer and group organizations, which all point to positive future developments.


VII. Recommendations

The mission recommended that Project One [ETH/82/C05] be considered technically complete, and that all equipment be left with regional Irrigation Development Teams (regional arms of IDD) for use in the zonal area only. Any residual funds in the UNCDF project account should be used for the supply of essential spare parts to return equipment to a satisfactory operating status. The TA consultants, Euroconsult, recommended in their Completion and Reformulation Report the adoption of a step-by-step approach for further small-scale irrigation development that is in line with farmer response and regional policy. The mission concurs with this and further recommends that there should be a short pause in any new small scale irrigation development other than the completion of physical works already started until these issues have been resolved.

On Project Two [ETH/85/C02], the mission found that both schemes already had extensive and successful traditional irrigation systems; therefore the technical and economic basis for their development, as presently planned, is questionable. Moreover, due to the delays and uncertainties surrounding Hare and Basso development and the reservations regarding the technical and economic merit of the Chinese scheme, the mission recommends that UNCDF terminate its investment in the project unless it is redesigned with participation and full agreement of all interested parties. UNCDF also needs to review the implications of the use of the machinery that it supplied if the project goes ahead without such an agreement. The IDD's workload calls for the mobilization of all available machinery and in this respect the mission recommends that any residual funds in the UNCDF project be used to supply the essential spare parts to return equipment to a satisfactory operating status.


VIII. Policy Implications and Lessons Learned

Small-scale irrigation in Ethiopia will never be extensive or productive enough to have a significant impact on food security except at a very local level. Therefore, it is far more sound to focus on meeting the needs of disadvantaged areas experiencing an overall food deficit because of adverse climate and where there is little or no existing irrigation rather than trying to mead the food shortfall on a national level by speeding up production in surplus areas. Because of the inevitably high cost of developing irrigation schemes in such circumstances, design should favor farmer-oriented, cost-effective solutions, rather than solutions that might at first appear technically superior. In general, construction and rehabilitation should maximize manual labor rather than mechanized labor.

Moreover, it is imperative to have the full participation and commitment of the benefiting farmers, including awareness and acceptance of financial responsibility, otherwise the schemes will not succeed or will produce a low economic return. No scheme should be started without farmer consultation and full community mobilization and participation, and continuation of the project should be dependent on the active and sustained assistance of the beneficiary population, both in cash and in kind.


IX. Evaluation Team

The Evaluation Team consisted of RH & H Consult, Denmark, Mr. Jim Sample (Agricultural Economist Team leader) and Mr. Bill Bradfield (Irrigation Engineer).