Project Evaluation Summaries
Prepared by the Policy, Planning and Evaluation Unit (PPEU)

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Guinea

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I. Basic Project Data

II. Background

By the 1980s, the poor state of Guinea's roads had become one of the major constraints to the country's economic development. For example, in Fouta Djallon, a region providing much of the country's agricultural production and livestock, the national road connecting the prefectures of Dalaba and Tougue had become impassible due to the bad conditions of the causeway and other edifices. This added 24 kilometers to the distance that had to be traveled, thereby increasing costs and lowering productivity. The heavily agricultural area of Soumbalako in the prefecture of Mamou was similarly constrained by a lack of access roads along the national Mamou-Dabola road. The Government of Guinea therefore requested financial assistance from UNCDF to rehabilitate 300 kilometers of road in this southeastern region of Fouta-Djallon, as part of its broader effort to rehabilitate rural infrastructure.

III. The Project

The immediate objective in the first phase of this two-phase project was to rehabilitate and maintain 167 kilometers of rural roads in the southeastern region of Fouta Djallon: 142 kms between Dalaba and Tougue; and 25 kms in the area of Soumbalako. This was to be achieved with the help of a newly established independent mechanized brigade in the Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources (MARA). The brigade would assist in the training of nationals who would then be able to take over the rehabilitation and maintenance of priority rural roads without foreign technical assistance.

The long term objective of the project was to contribute to the Government's rural development program through the following means:

• developing new agricultural lands by providing access to areas previously difficult to reach;
  
  
• improving marketability of agricultural products by improving access to rural and urban markets;
  
  
• increasing agricultural production and reducing the cost of local and imported products;
  
  
• reinforcing the capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources to carry out the construction of a national network of access roads.

IV. Purpose of the Evaluation

The purpose of this Mission was to evaluate the results achieved based on the objectives and expected results. The Mission was to analyze the project design and the efficiency of project execution, as well as the pertinence, use and the impact of the achieved results. The mission also hoped to identify those factors that facilitated or prevented execution and to formulate concrete proposals to improve the efficiency of the execution of the remaining activities.

V. Findings of the Evaluation Mission

A. Assessment of results achieved

The Mission found that the main works set out in the project document had been constructed: the 96 km section of the Dalaba-Tougue road, and the 27 km section of the Mamou-Dabola Road, although some problems had arisen in the village of Malipan and the Kioma bridge because of seven drainage pipes that had not been installed. With regard to training, the brigade had done a good job, but the national management team had been scattered at the end and this might have a negative impact on the good results. With regard to the financial plan, there was a need for ongoing budget increase, and delays in the decision-making process regarding these cost increases sometimes slowed the work.

As a result of the project, accessibility in the region had been improved, and this had had an important impact on the life of the target population. Although the Mission was critical of the fact that workers who were employed by the project were often not from the region.

The project document singled out the construction of reinforced concrete structures for execution by contractors, yet for unknown reasons, the project instead executed these works by force account. This created many inconveniences: a national administration, and even more so an international administration like UNDP does not have the necessary capacity to execute works as a contractor. Furthermore, the absence of competition and control of productivity does not produce works at minimum cost. In addition, the team found that the theft of gasoline and unauthorized use of equipment created serious problems for the project.

The mission team found it difficult to collect the information necessary to evaluate the project, due to the absence of the technical assistance team, poor quality reports prepared by the project particularly the final report, lack of Government technical support and inaccessibility of the existing archives. For example, the pre-project inventory of the works was not very detailed despite the provision in the project document for such a study. It was particularly difficult to ascertain if the capacity. Building objective - to create an independent brigade capable of executing the works without further technical assistance - had been reached. Despite an agreement reached with the DNGR, neither the works remaining to be completed nor the maintenance had been executed.

B. Assessment of project design

The Mission noted the following shortcomings in the project design:

• The equipment ordered by the brigade was not adapted for the local conditions. Spare parts took months to receive and 6-wheel trucks, rather than 10-wheel trucks, would have been cheaper to maintain. Moreover, the use of highly mechanized means to execute the works resulted in lower than expected rates of job creation.
  
  
• The most basic problem with the project design regarding subcontracting was the absence of a budget line for payment of these contractors.
  
  
• The decision to put an administrative and financial manager in charge of the project was not a good one. Such a manager was necessary but should have been under the authority of the engineer-project manager.
  
  
• With regard to environmental impact, the project could have done more to reduce the impact of erosion created by the drainage pipes and in order to reinstate the gravel pits after use.

VI. Recommendations

Many of the problems associated with the project could have been avoided by fielding a pre-project study, turning over execution to a contractor and providing for adequate project supervision. More specifically, the Mission recommended various maintenance activities to alleviate problems with the Kioma bridge. In the village of Malipan, the backfill of seven drainage pipes should be completed as soon as possible, along with the anti-erosion walls and the gravel course. With regard to technical assistance, the Mission recommended that the team trained by the project be kept together to be used as a training team. The Mission agreed with the decision of the Government to subcontract from now on all road works to private contractors and create the necessary structures for training them.

VII. Policy Implications and Lessons Learned

Future projects should take into account complaints from the project staff regarding the inefficient financial procedures of the United Nations which caused numerous delays in the execution of project activities. In addition, the project staff complained of long delays in the procurement of spare parts and equipment. The lessons learned from the failure to subcontract project construction or implementation to a contractor should be taken into account in the formulation of future projects. In order to asses the pros and cons of executing works by force account by mechanized brigade or by high intensity of man power, UNCDF should request a comparative study of related works executed in the West Africa sub- region.

VIII. Evaluation Team

The evaluation team was composed of Mr. Mohamed Mansour Kaba, Mission Chief and Mr. Eddy Bynens, Transport Engineer.