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Case Studies/Project Profiles: Uganda


Perspective of managing a National Programme and resolving the competing and conflicting interests:
Experiences from the District development Programme

By Martin Onyach-Olaa[1]
Co-ordinator, Programme Management Unit
Decentralisation Secretariat
Ministry of Local Government

1.0 Introduction

This paper highlights the experiences in managing a National Programme and resolving the competing and conflicting interest. The experiences are drawn from the implementation of the Peri-Urban Infrastructure Project (PUIP) pilot funded by the World Bank, the District Development Project (DDP) funded by the UNCDF/UNDP, and the Local Government Development Programme (LGDP) funded by the World Bank. The three programmes had a budget of US $ 600,000; US $ 15.4 million and US $ 89.9 million respectively. The PUIP was a two years pilot covering only four municipalities, the DDP is a pilot covering 5 Districts, 106 Sub-Counties, and over 400 Parishes; and the LGDP is a scale up of the DDP and is national in coverage

Policy context

In 1992 His Excellency announced the decentralisation policy. This led to the Local Government (Resistance Councils) Statute of 1993. During 1994 the first stages of fiscal decentralisation were underway in thirteen districts and Urban Councils. The promulgation of the Constitution in 1995 and the enactment of the Local Government Act, 1997 further entrenched the principles of decentralisation by empowering Local Governments with responsibilities for the allocation of public resources, for integrated participatory planning, budgeting and investment management. DDP-LGDP is therefore being implemented within these policy framework.

Institutional arrangements and mandate

The Constitution clearly delineated the roles and functions of central governments under decentralised governance. Central ministries' new responsibilities are to ensure implementation of national policies and adherence to performance standards on part of Local Governments. Line Ministries are therefore expected to set standards, inspect, monitor, mentor and where necessary offer technical advice, support supervision and training within their respective sectors. Responsibilities for service delivery have been decentralised to Local Governments[2], which are corporate entities. As a result of the decentralisation policy a number of reforms had to be undertaken. This included political decentralisation and administrative decentralisation reforms (de-linking about 26 vertically organised departments at the district level from their respective ministries, and creation of the local government administration). In 1998 Line Ministries were restructured to make then more responsive to their new mandates under decentralisation.

Over view of the DDP-LGDP as National Programmes

In early 1995 Government conceived the PUIP to pilot provision of services by communities through a participatory demand driven approach in four municipalities. The sectors identified through a participatory approach were water, sanitation, access roads, drainage and solid waste management. The World Bank availed US $ 600,000 to pilot this principle. In 1995, Government of Uganda reached agreement with IDA and UNCDF to pilot devolution of discretionary development budget-support to 5 districts through the District Development Project (DDP). This was designed to test the anticipated Local Governments Act and create a "policy experiment" for developing procedures for decentralised planning, financing and service delivery. The experience of the DDP formed the basis for design of the Local Government Development Programme (LGDP), which is devolving development funds through the Local Development Grant (LDG) and Capacity Building Grant (CBG) nationally.

2.0 DDP-LGDP implementation experiences.

The DDP - LGDP approach combines building good local governance with the implementation of development investments. The programmes provide non-sector specific development grants to LGs according to transparent formulae. Under the DDP resources were allocated based on a national formula, which was acceptable to all the Districts and provided in the Local Governments Act, 1997. Four variables namely population, land area, school age going children (6 - 14 years), and child mortality with weights of 20%, 15%, 25% and 40% respectively was used. These parameters were agreed upon because of its needs based and was consistent with the stakeholders priorities particularly at the lower Local council and community levels. The formula for sub-counties was based on land area, population and ratio of school age going children with weights of 35%, 25%, and 40% respectively, the same proportional weighting's as in District formula, but adjusted on pro-rata basis to account for the exclusion of the child mortality factor due to absence of reliable data at the sub-county level. The parish/community were to receive as Indicative Planning Figures (IPFs) a ration of 30% of the Sub-County allocation and this figure was to be shared amongst the Parishes/Communities within the Sub-County on a pro rata basis based on population. The Parishes/Communities were to receive the fund as Indicative Planning Figures (IPFs) not actual cash because they are administrative units and not body corporate. The District was to retain 35% and 65% to be passed to Sub-Counties of which 30% is earmarked for Parish/communities.

Under LGDP the LDG is simply allocated according to population and land area[3] with population weighing 85% and land area 15%. The share to the lower LGs followed also the DDP percentages.

LGs qualify to access these grants once they have achieved specified minimum governance criteria. The governance criteria are derived directly from the requirements set out in the Local Governments Act 1997 (LGA) and the Local Government Finance and Accounting Regulations 1998 (LGFAAR). LGs are required to co-finance the development funds received with 10% contribution in cash, in addition to scheme-specific local contributions from communities.

Central to the DDP-LGDP design is the annual assessments of all levels of LGs against the pre-set governance criteria ('minimum access conditions') and performance criteria. The 'minimum conditions' determine whether a LG is eligible to access the Local Development Grant. The performance criteria, assessed in retrospect, determine whether a local government is eligible for a reward or penalty (i.e. whether the amount of the Development Grant is to be increased or decreased for the next financial year by 20%).

Minimum conditions

The minimum conditions (access criteria) include:

  1. Development planning capacity (e.g. availability of a council-approved District Development Plan and functional planning committees.)
  2. Financial management (e.g. proper maintenance of accounts, adherence to procurement regulations.)
  3. Technical capability (e.g. capacity to supervise engineering works)
  4. Programme specific conditions (e.g. 10% co-financing)

Districts which do not meet the minimum access criteria can still benefit from the Capacity Building Grant (a separate funding-line under DDP-LGDP) in order to assist them qualify for development funding in future.

The table below summarises the minimum condition assessments results for the FY1998/9 to FY2000/1 for both the Districts and the Sub-Counties LGs.

Table 1: Minimum Condition assessment results for DDP LGs, FY1998/9 - 2000/1.

Financial Year District LGs Sub-County LGs
Met Not Met Met Not Met
1998/9 5 0 61 34
1999/0 2 3 72 32
2000/1 5 0 72 32

Performance Measures

Districts and sub-counties operate under incentive and penalty system linked to good governance and service delivery. Those that perform well against specified performance criteria receive an increase in their allocations in subsequent years (an additional 20%), whilst those, which perform poorly, have their investment funds reduced by 20%. The performance measures are the following:

  1. Efforts made to improve the quality of the development plan[4]
  2. Allocation of the development grant in line with National Priority Programme Areas (PPA)[5]
  3. Timely accountability and in line with actual allocation and expenditure decision (implementation track record).
  4. Capacity building effort
  5. Staff functional capacity[6]
  6. Tendering capacity and performance[7]
  7. Monitoring reports
  8. Mentoring plans and reports of a higher LG to a lower LG.
  9. 10% co-funding being provided.

Each of the above performance indicators has a number of sub-indicators with a score. Every May/June LGs are assessed and their performances scored against each of the above indicator. The table below summarises the assessment results[8] for the FY1999/0 and 2000/1.

Table 2: Performance Measures assessment results for DDP LGs, FY1999/0 - 2000/1.

Financial Year District LGs Sub-County LGs
Rewarded Static Sanctioned Rewarded Static Sanctioned
1999/0 3 0 2 52 10 22
2000/1 1 1 3 36 26 42

It is important to note that the performances of both the District and the Sub-Counties were better in the FY1998/9. This is because in the FY1998/9 all the LGs received their planned capacity building grant. However in the FY1999/0 less than 10% of the planned capacity building grant was disbursed to LGs. This adversely affect LGs performances since they could implement their capacity building plan to support the investment grants they had received.

M & E reviews

The implementation of the DDP - LGDP is being monitored and evaluated biannually, in November/December and May/June, to document lessons to inform policy review. The May/June is for minimum condition and performance measures assessments while the November/December is for reviewing topical policy and implementation issues. Over the programme implementation period the following policy issues have been reviewed and some of the review have led to policy studies.

  1. How best could Gender be mainstreamed in the DDP-LGDP implementation
  2. How best could LGs be assisted to improve their Appraisal capacity and techniques in productive agriculture investment
  3. How could LGs Development Plans be Poverty focus
  4. How can Cross sector analysis be improved by LGs in their Development Plans
  5. How can Communication (for transparency, accountability and value for money) be improved in LGs
  6. How can the capacities of LG be improved for Documentation, storage and retrieval of records
  7. How can the current Multiplicity of Conditional Grants be reduced both in terms of numbers and volume
  8. How can procurement procedures in LGs be improved without undermining the public procurement principle of competition, fairness, transparency, value for money and timely delivery of services.

As a result of the M&E reviews a number of policy studies have been completed and some in the pipeline. With funding from UNCDF and Government, studies have been completed in response to the concerns raised on issues (b), (g), and (h). ToRs for studies to address issues under (a) and (e) above have been prepared and are ready for implementation.

Investment portfolio Under the DDP-LGDP, all service delivery functions within the LG Act Schedule II part 2 - with the exception of security - are eligible for funding. Local Governments can choose to fund activities outside the PEAP priorities - such as council buildings - but if expenditure on non-PEAP-priorities exceeds 20%, they are sanctioned in the form of decrease in allocation in subsequent years. The investment menu is mainly capital items, but some recurrent expenditure is allowed as long as it is related to investment and is less than 20% of the total budget[9]. LGs are allowed use the investment fund for investment planning and monitoring ('investment servicing costs') up to a maximum of 10% of the total fund and up to 5% for monitoring and documentation of the experiences.

The use of DDP-LGDP funds appears unconditional in that funds are not tied to a specific sector, but LGs have to adhere to the overall planning procedures and co-funding rules. Importantly, they must meet the annual minimum criteria and performance criteria. Because DDP-LGDP incentives prioritise investment in PEAP, DDP-LGDP investments are in practice, in exactly the same sectors as those funded under the Poverty Action Fund Conditional Grant (PAF-CG)[10]: Education, Health, Water, Roads and, to a lesser extent, agricultural production. This is clear from the table below, which sets out the actual sectoral allocations, resulting from the LG and community-driven projects in the 5 DDP districts.

Table 3: DDP Use of Investment Funds by sector and main activity 1998 - 2000[11]

Sector Allocation Examples
Education 43.7% Class room construction; Teachers houses; Desks and furniture; School library
Roads 14.8% Opening of small roads; Culverts
Health 27.7% Construction of health units at parish and Sub-county level
Mattresses, beds and furniture for Health units; Staff housing (grass thatched huts)
Water 8.5% Gravity flow schemes; Protected springs; Borehole rehabilitation; Rain water harvesting for institutions; Institutional latrines; Water for cattle
Production 4.1 % Cattle markets (Kotido); Improved seeds/crops for multiplication; Improved livestock for multiplication (heifers & rabbits in Kabale); Environmental protection trough tree planting.
Other 1.2% Sub-county office blocks; Cash Safes for Sub-counties

Impact of the DDP

The implementation of the DDP has had tremendous impact on decentralisation and governance debate in Uganda. These are some of the areas which the programme have had impacts at District and National levels.

DDP Impact at District level

During the Formulation Stage, a number of community and district profiling baseline activities were done to establish a reasonable basis on which the DDP would be designed. During the subsequent Establishment Phases, capacity assessments and remedial training were made to establish and enhance Local Governments' readiness to access the Local Development Fund (LDF). The M&E Reviews has revealed substantial improvements in the Planning, Allocation, Investment and Management-within the Local Governments of the pilot Districts since the inception of the District Development Programme. In the planning area, all pilot Districts now have a three-year rolling plan with a budget. The sub-counties have investment plans dully compiled under guidance of the DDP, using the sub-county Investment Planning Guide. The DDP has provided Communities with a development budget support, which has enabled them to think towards the overall development objectives of their community.

Through the DDP support, the District Technical Planning Committees and Sub-County Technical Committees are appraising their investment proposals. Today these Local Governments are subjecting their investments proposals to simple appraisal questions such as: how may people shall benefit from the investment?; how consistent is the investment with the Government Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP)?; how much would it cost to complete the investment and how much can we raise locally?; what is the recurrent cost implication for the operations and maintenance of the project and who shall be responsible to meet it? Etc. In summary a culture is developing where LGs Technical Planning Committees are starting to ask appraisal questions for the various project proposals they are receiving, whether it is from communities or politicians, a culture that hitherto use not to exist.

In the area of public procurement, there has equally been marked improvement through the deliberate effort under the project to build the capacities of the parties which are involved in the procurement cycle either from the supply (suppliers/contractors) or demand (client) including the LGs Tender Boards themselves. As a result, LG Tender Boards are now publishing the dates for their meetings; more flexible about the form of advertisement which can easily be assessed by the various categories contractors/suppliers; and have now shifted from fix bid fees and securities, to a variable rates depending on the value of the contract and its complexity.

The procurement training conducted to the District Technical staff (client), the local artisans (contractors) and the tender board members greatly helped LGs to appreciate the separation of the roles of the client-contractor-supervisor. To date more than 85% of the services funded from the development resources availed to Local Governments under the programme has been contracted out with the council as the client and the technical staff as the supervisors.

The DDP has created a high sense of ownership for the investments made under the programme. Communities have ownerships in investments in which they have participated. The 10% co-funding provide a strong buy in mechanism to communities to ensure sustainability. As such most of the projects implemented under the DDP had Project Management Committees (PMCs) appointed by the respective beneficiary communities and are charged with the responsibility for the management and maintenance of the investments.

DDP impact at the National level

At the National level, the DDP has greatly contributed to the policy debates on how LGs should be financed under a decentralised environment. The successful implementation of the DDP during the first two years 1998-1999 had a big influence on the World Bank Local Government Development Programme (LGDP). LGDP has build on the experiences of the DDP. It has scaled nationally to all levels of LGs the discretionary budget support funding, which was piloted under the DDP.

As a result of the debate as to how Government should finance service delivery under a decentralised policy in LGs Government commissioned, the Fiscal Decentralisation Study in October 2000. this was done in response to concerns over the growing number and diversity of ways in which financial resources are being transferred to local government from the national budget. Over the past three years, the growth in conditional grant transfers, as a result of increased inflows to the Poverty Action Fund (PAF) from debt relief, PAF-specific donor budget support, and government funds[12], 26 different transfer systems have been developed to date. The Study was to bring forward practical and implementable proposals to streamline and strengthen current transfer systems. Regarding development transfer, the study recommended that:

"The MoLG's DDP-LGDP methodology is the only transfer system specifically designed to accord with the Local Governments Act and the structure and organisation of local government in Uganda. DDP-LGDP uses the availability of development finance to incentivise capacity building and strengthened local governance through the mechanism of access and performance conditionalities with associated rewards and penalties. The DDP- LGDP methodology has clear benefits in terms of community involvement, local ownership, sustainability and governance building"

The Programme for Modernisation of agriculture (PMA)[13] has also adopted the DDP-LGDP implementation modality for the disbursement of its resources to LGs.

3.0 Competing and conflicting interest

The implementation of the DD-LGDP to say the least has not been very simple. There were a number of competing and conflicting interests. This was mainly because the DDP-LGDP was the first national programmes to take the issues of decentralisation and good governance a step further by providing discretionary investment funds to LGs. The LGs and communities have the responsibility for Planning, Allocating, Investing and Managing (PAIM) the interventions without any interference from the central Government. Some of the competing and conflicting interest, which have been experienced as a result of the implementation of the DDP-LGDP are the following:

National Development Objectives verses Local Development Needs

Although empirically the investments made by LGs are in line with the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), there is a very strong argument that DDP-LGDP modality may not fully be in line with Government policy as they are made entirely at a local level. The fears are that the roles of line ministries in quality assurance of investment become very difficult and are not well articulated in the Act. Hence many line ministries officials do not understand fully what their new mandates are under decentralisation. The second competing interest is that the DDP-LGDP modality may not be able to handle the volume of investments needed to rebuild the infrastructure of a single sector completely such as primary education[14] and health centre construction.

Outputs verses Outcomes

The core objective of the DDP-LGDP was to improve good governance through participatory decision making for improved service delivery. The idea is therefore that for whatever investment a LG or community has decided to make there should be evidence that the choice was arrived at through a participatory process, which has to be seen carried through the entire cycle of the project implementation. Although such an approach improves the quality of investment choice, it does not necessary mean that the final out put will be the state of the art. This has created competing and conflicting interest with central bureaucrats who want to design and construct the latest schools, water points, roads etc. However the biggest achievement of the DDP-LGDP modality has been the empowerment of the LGs and communities to come together and discuss their problems and identify solutions within a given budget constraints.

Sector Wide Approaches (SWAP) verses LGs Development Plans

It is being argued that funding through the DDP-LGDP modality cannot guarantee, a priori, on which sectors the funds will be spent. This seems to contradict the SWAP approaches, which set countrywide investment plans and targets and allocate funds accordingly. Proponents of the DDP-LGDP approach argues that the fulfilment of sector targets PEAP goals is not guaranteed beforehand as the investment decision is at the local level. That the actual outputs are only known ex-post. The LGs who have tasted the real power in determining the types of service delivery demanded by the communities they represent argues that line ministries are using the arguments to re-centralised service delivery. They fear that this may not address the local development need of the communities in a LG. One LG cited an example where through a sector approach they were allocated Uganda Shillings 1.5 billion for water for the FY2000/1 and an IPF for water sector for the next year was Uganda Shillings 1.8 billion. This allocation was done centrally despite the fact that the LG had already 75% water coverage and with the Uganda Shillings 1.5 billion, it could have had 100% coverage. They argued that if the transfer was like under the DDP-LGDP system they would be able to allocate the Uganda Shillings 1.8 billion to other deserving sectors such as education, roads, and health.

The experiences from the implementation of the DDP-LGDP on this debate has been that the centre could know which sectors LGs would wish to invest in before the actual investments have taken place. This is because disbursement under the DDP-LGDP to LGs is based on annual quarterly work plans and cash flows, which are within the IPFs for each LG. Sector allocations tend to undermined the flexibility of LGs to switch investments within sectors.

Equity allocation verses Poverty focus

The allocation of resources under the DDP was based on four parameters: land area, population, child mortality and school age going population. The LGDP was based only on two parameters - land area and population. Critiques of the DDP-LGDP system are arguing that the programme designs were not sensitive to poverty nor does it attempt to address the inequalities amongst LGs. The conflict here is that DDP-LGDP is being look at as a panacea to solving all the development needs of LGs, forgetting that both programmes were designed primarily to test the provision of the Constitution and the LGs Act in as far as good governance and service delivery by LGs in a decentralised environment is concerned. The design of DDP-LGDP and the philosophy of the programme is in conflict with those of donors and NGOs who feel their mandate is more to address inequality but not good governance and improved service delivery through LGs' institutional strengthening.

Demand driven verses needs driven

DDP-LGDP is performance and demand driven programmes. LGs have to have certain minimum capacities before they can access the development grant. The minimum conditions are measures of good governance and they provide the necessary levels of comfort both to the donors and Government that the development grants being released to LGs shall be used for the purpose for which they were intended. The tension with this approach is that those who might be very needy may not, and in many cases do not have the necessary capacities to meet the minimum access requirements. The programmes have therefore had conflict of interest as to whether those who are needy, but have no capacity, should have special backup support from the centre so as to close the capacity gap.

There was a lot of public out cry from LGs after the second performance assessment, which resulted into many LGs being sanctioned due to poor performance in the second year. Some LGs made special appeals to higher authority in Government although the assessment results and recommendations were with held on the ground that the parameters were discussed and agreed to with LGs.

Institutional Conflict: LCs system verses PRA methodologies

By default all residence of a village are members of the village council. They are therefore expected to discuss development needs of their village and implement those, which are within their capabilities. Those which they cannot, they are required to pass to the next council level. The implementation of the DDP-LGDP is using the existing local council system. This approach has been criticised mainly by NGOs and other development partners who prefer the use of other participatory processes such as the PRA methodologies. Experiences from the implementation of the DDP-LGDP as national programmes have demonstrated that the use of PRA methodologies can only be cost effective under pilot situations where the coverage and the target groups are few and the number of PRA facilitators are limited. In the case of LGDP the coverage is national and there are about 4,000 parishes. It would be inconceivable to have PRA facilitators in all the villages without the cost of carrying the PRA out weighing the intended investments for service delivery to be provided to the communities. Under the local council system the elected council officials service the programme from their normal budget funded from locally generated revenue. This approach was found to be cost effective and more sustainable not withstanding the competing and conflicting interest.

Donors requirements verses LGs requirements

The LGs Act, 1997; the LGs Financial and Accounting Regulations 1998; and the LGs Tender Boards Rules and Regulations 2000 have detailed the roles of LGs with respect to service delivery, accountability and general conduct and performance requirements. During the implementation of the DDP-LGDP as national programmes competing and conflicting interest arose between donors and LGs as to whose requirements should be up held. The major area of conflict has been in accountability. In the case of the DDP since the programme was intended to test legal provision for decentralisation, the preferred position of Government was that the LGs' accounting procedures should be applied. On the other hand UNDP preferred the use of UNDP accounting procedures. To date this concern has not yet been resolved.

Experiences from the implementation of the DDP have demonstrated that the UNDP system is more amenable to projects, which have few accountability centres. The requirements are rigid; batch in approach (not rolling), and very difficult to fulfil for national programmes where accountability statements are to be consolidated on a quarterly basis from many accounting centres. The DDP has one hundred and eleven accountability centres for the five Districts and their respective one hundred and five lower LGs. Each LG, being a corporate body, is required to account in its own right and the consolidation to be done at each higher LGs for submission to the centre for further consolidation. In practise the consolidated accountability statement from the LGs in many occasions delay because of the performances of some weak LGs. Partial submission would mean UNDP processing payments for only that portion for which the accountability is made on time. Any submission within the quarter will have to wait unit the next quarter before any replenishment is processed. Although Government had proposed to UNDP that the DDP should move to a rolling accountability where by the release for the first and second tranches are automatic but that for the third to be triggered by a satisfactory accountability of the first quarter, the proposal was not accepted since it would move the accountability requirement outside the norms of UNDP accountability. This recommendation was intended to provide a one-quarter's working capital from the project to LGs as revolving fund so as to avoid any unnecessary delays in the programme implementation.

Development Expenditures verses Recurrent Expenditures.

For every new investment there is an associated semi fixed and/or recurrent costs. Politicians and some donors are mainly keen to create new assets, which they can officiate at the opening ceremonies. This action is understandable because they prefer visible investments for political accountability. However such investments mean more budget burden on the community of the recipient LG. A new school requires semi fixed assets such as desks and textbooks and monthly recurrent expenditures for teachers' salaries. The same applies to health centres, which would require the drugs, staff salaries and hospital beds etc. There is therefore a competing and conflicting interest faced by not only the donors but also LGs. Given a resource envelope where should a LG invest. Should it improve the condition of service of its existing teachers, the learning environment of its existing students or should it build more classrooms. What does improving service delivery mean? If it is accessibility and quality then the conflict between capital investment (visible investment) and recurrent costs for servicing and maintaining existing or new projects need to be resolved. For example the DDP funds cannot be used for paying the salaries of medical staff or teachers but can be used for building of health units and classroom blocks. Is the distinction between development and recurrent expenditures/budgets still relevant?

Line Ministries roles verses LGs roles

Despite the clear statutory and policy framework for decentralisation, Line Ministries are suffering from structural rigidities. Line Ministries' staffs have not fully come in to terms with their changing roles under decentralisation. Some still believe that it is their responsibility and prerogative to dictate on which activities LGs should invest and by how much. The LGs participating in the DDP demonstrated that provided a clear frame for incentives, sanctions and performance assessment they have the capacity to deliver on their mandates as LGs. It would therefore seem apparent that the failure of Line Ministries to respond effectively, efficiently, and timely to its new responsibilities as prescribed under the law would be the major threat to the decentralisation process in Uganda. Line ministries should quickly transform themselves from hitherto service providers to mentors and supervisors for LGs service delivery. The DDP evaluations over the last two and half years have demonstrated that the slow pace at which line ministries were upgrading their conduct and systems to support their new roles for good governance can fundamentally compromise the performance of LGs.

Donors verses Donors competing and conflicting interest

Since 1992, donors have actively supported implementation of decentralisation policy; both through support to central agencies and most particularly through direct support to Local Governments. Diverse ranges of donor-supported initiatives are being implemented in association with Local Governments under the decentralisation policy framework. Some donors are providing the following types of assistance to LGs:

  • Direct Technical assistance
  • Budget supports for the implementation of LGs budgets
  • Financing of projects
  • Support to specific sectors
  • Capacity building support to LGs
  • Community based support
  • Women empowerment support
  • Income generating support

In implementing the above supports, donors have used different approaches. Some have extended their support by going through the MoLG; others have gone directly to the LGs. Some have preferred to adopt implementation modalities which by pass the existing Local Government structures by appointing staff which are directly paid by them (donors) and answerable to them. Others have financed activities, which are not captured by the local Government planning and budgetary processes. Some donors have adopted different accounting and reporting formats from LGs. In summary there had been no uniform approach to donors' interaction with LGs. Government is considering harmonising donor interactions with LGs. There is therefore a competing and conflicting interest as to which system shall be recommended and adopted for use by donors.

Non-subordination verses integration

The principle governing LGs operation in Uganda is that of "integration with non-subordination". This principle has created tensions between some higher and lower LGs. Lower LGs look at themselves as autonomous corporate bodies and as such higher LGs should not "interfere" in their business. For example the authority for planning and expropriation of funds is vested in the councils. It therefore means that a plan and budget of a lower level council once approved by that council, the higher LG cannot reverse the decision. At the time the higher LG is required to integrate the plans and budgets of lower LG, mentor and offer technical advice. The conflict is therefore on how far should a higher LG go in order to ensure that the lower LGs are doing the correct things without usurping their powers?

Use of LGs system verses NGOs, CSOs and Private Sector

The mainstreaming of the implementation of the DDP-LGDP within the LGs system was mainly for strengthening the LGs institutions and ensure sustainability. However this resulted into competing and conflicting interest from the roles of the NGOs, CSO and the private sector. The national NGO forum[15] expressed concerned that the DDP-LGDP has not made use of the NGOs. Their preference was for the programme to have special budget lines for those activities which NGOs have comparative advantages in LGs. The secretary of the forum is a member of the Project Technical Committee (PTC)[16]. The committee meets quarterly to review implementation of the programme from a National perspective.

Despite the call from the forum for a special budget line for NGOs, LGs have rejected this request on two grounds. One, LGs have argued that some NGOs are not transparent in their budgets for those activities they are doing at LGs levels. Two, since about 85% of the works under the DDP-LGDP are being contracted out, NGOs are free to bid and compete. Those, which have comparative advantages, shall win the bids and be awarded the contracts.

Piloting verses national coverage.

Piloting is usually justified as a mechanism for testing new approaches or methodologies. However over the years, Uganda has witnessed incidences where some LGs or part of the country have been over piloted with different types of projects and programmes. With decentralisation, there is increasing concern from politicians who want to show to their constituencies that they are delivering. The general trend with the national legislature has been that of reluctance to approve loans for programmes, which are pilot in nature and not covering the entire country. This raises the question as to "for how long should a pilot be undertaken?" and "how quickly can the experiences from the pilot be scaled nationally?"

4.0 Proposal to resolving some of the conflicts

Modern concepts of good governance invoke as essential the elements of political accountability, freedom of association and participation, reliable and equitable legal framework, bureaucratic transparency; the availability of valid information; and effective and efficient public sector management. In Uganda decentralisation has been identified as the most appropriate vehicle for achieving this objective. Through decentralisation the Local Governments' systems have been able to advocate for the interest of their constituencies; consult with the people in the formulation of policies and decision making, make regular reporting back to the electorate, and conduct regular election to office in accordance to the law. This has created full awareness of the electorates of their rights and obligations, and the empowering of civic society. However as noted above these achievements have created tensions, which have to be solved with time. With commitment and the spirit of give and take some of the above conflicts can be resolved through the following mechanisms:

  • Sharing of experiences and net working
  • Regular Co-ordination meetings of stakeholders
  • Clear legal frame work delineating roles, responsibilities and mandates
  • Commitment from highest political leadership to be the prime mover
  • Donors' commitment to work within existing institutional and legal framework of a given country.

The proposals above are neither exhaustive nor easy to easy to implement. The conflicts are real and it is higher time efforts are made to start addressing them in order to avoid derailing the process of decentralisation.

5.0 Conclusion.

Uganda is being considered as one of the most advanced country in Africa Region as far as decentralisation is concerned. There is no doubt that a lot has been achieved by Uganda through the various reforms to ensure that decentralisation become a reality.

The Government's goal is to eradicate extreme poverty by 2017 by shifting public expenditures and donor assistance into areas with a greater impact on poverty - such as rural development, physical infrastructure, direct human development and decentralised governance. The DDP-LGDP is the first generation national programme, which is testing the discretional budget support to LGs so as to empower them to take charge of the destiny of the communities they represent with respect to provision of services.

The country national budget is being greatly influenced by the view of the local people. The Uganda Participatory Poverty Assessment Report (UPPAP)-June 2000 - "Learning from the poor" concluded that "the voice of the poor counts". The national Medium Term Expenditure Framework Paper (MTEP) for Uganda has greatly been influenced and informed by the UPPAP assessment.

Despite these positive developments, there are tensions and resistance from some quarters. Some stakeholders want to continue with business as usual hence the apparent contradictions and conflicts, which have been observed during the implementation of the DDP-LGDP. Some of these conflicts are arising as a result of the slow institutional response to changes and new ideas. However where there is a will and commitment, challenges of whatever size and magnitude can be overcome no matter how long it takes. The decentralisation process in Uganda has reach a non-reversible level. This is the resolve and commitment of Government and the people of Uganda.

References:

  1. The Republic of Uganda (1995)-Constitution of the Republic of Uganda
  2. The Republic of Uganda (1997)-The Local Governments Act
  3. The Republic of Uganda (1998)-The Local Governments Financial and Accounting Regulations
  4. The Republic of Uganda (2000)-The Local Government Tender Board Rules and Regulation.
  5. UNDP Poverty Report (2000)-Overcoming Human Poverty
  6. UNCDF/UNDP/Ministry of Local Government (1997)-District Development Project-Pilot
  7. UNCDF/UNDP/Ministry of Local Government (1998)-Kotido District Development Project
  8. World Bank (1999)- Project Appraisal Document (PAD) for the Local Government Development Program
  9. Republic of Uganda, Ministry of Local Government (1999)-Project Implementation Plan for the Local Government Development Program
  10. Republic of Uganda, Ministry of Local Government (1999)-District Minimum conditions for accessing the Local Development Fund (LDF)
  11. Republic of Uganda, Ministry of Local Government (1999)-Sub-County Minimum conditions for accessing the Local Development Fund (LDF)
  12. Republic of Uganda, Ministry of Local Government (1999)-District Performance Measures for the Local Development Fund (LDF)
  13. Republic of Uganda, Ministry of Local Government (1999)-Sub-County Performance Measures for the Local Development Fund (LDF)
  14. Republic of Uganda, Ministry of Local Government (1999)-Paris, Village, Community Performance Measures for the Local Development Fund (LDF)
  15. Republic of Uganda, Ministry of Local Government (1999)-How the Capacity Building Fund works
  16. Republic of Uganda, Ministry of Local Government (2000)-District Development Project (DDP) and Local Government Development Programme (LGDP) Assessment Manual of Minimum Conditions and Performance Measures for Local Governments
  17. UNCDF/UNDP/Ministry of Local Government (1998) - District Development Project - Minimum Condition Assessments Results.
  18. UNCDF/UNDP/Ministry of Local Government (1999) - District Development Project - Minimum Condition and Performance Assessments Results.
  19. UNCDF/UNDP/Ministry of Local Government (2000) - District Development Project - Minimum Condition and Performance Assessments Results.
  20. UNCDF/UNDP/Ministry of Local Government (1998)-District Development Project-Pilot Evaluation Review Final Report.
  21. UNCDF/UNDP/Ministry of Local Government (1999)-District Development Project-Pilot Evaluation Review Final Report.
  22. James Omoding, Annet Mpabulungi and Deb Johnson (1999) - UNCDF-Uganda Working Brief Series - Commitment, Participation, and Trust, Insights from the District Development Project.
  23. Ms. Annet Mpabulungi (1999) - UNCDF-Uganda Working Brief Series-Assessment of the Cascade Training, Insights from the District Development Project.
  24. UNCDF-Uganda Working Brief Series (1999)-Local Government Planning, Insights from the District Development Project.
  25. UNCDF-Uganda Working Brief Series (1999)-Production Arrangements: From design through appraisal and supervision, Insights from the District Development Project.
  26. Martin Onyach-Olaa (1999) - UNCDF-Uganda Working Brief Series-Mentoring of Lower level Local Governments by District Local Governments, Insights from the District Development Project.
  27. Mr. Sswakambo Emanuel (2000) - UNCDF-Uganda Working Brief Series-Linking the clients with service providers, Insights from Karamoja Pilot Development Project.
  28. Pasquale Ngorok (2000) - UNCDF-Uganda Working Brief Series-Power relations in Karamoja: Implications for Decentralised Governance, Insights from the Kotido District Development Project.
  29. UNCDF-Uganda Working Brief Series-Financial Transfers and Local Government Accountability, Insights from the District Development Project.
  30. UNCDF-Uganda Working Brief Series-Implementing Capacity Building Fund Initiatives: Successes and Challenges, Insights from the District Development Project.
  31. Martin Onyach-Olaa and Doug Porter (2000) - UNCDF-Uganda Working Brief Series-The changing Responsibilities of Central Government - Insights from the District Development Project.
  32. Martin Onyach-Olaa and Doug Porter (1999) - Inclusive Planning and Allocation for Rural Services; Development in Practice 9, nos. 1-2, February 1999.
  33. The Republic of Uganda, Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (2000) - Uganda Participatory Poverty Assessment Report: "Learning from the poor".
  34. The Republic of Uganda (2001) - Study to define the modalities for the proposed PMA "Non-Sectoral Conditional Grant" - Draft Final Report.
  35. The Republic of Uganda (2001) - Fiscal Decentralisation Study - Final Report.

Footnotes


1     Martin Onyach-Olaa is the Co-ordinator, Programme Management Unit (PMU), Decentralisation Secretariat, Ministry of Local Government responsible for the implementation of the DDP-LGDP. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and should not therefore be taken as the official position of any of the institutions referred to in the paper. Any omission or commission is the sole responsibility of the author.
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2     The following are LGs: Districts, City, Municipality, Municipal Division, Town Councils, and Sub-Counties.
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3     The argument was that the parameter of child mortality, school age going population and population were all populated related parameters hence they should all be subsumed under population.
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4     This includes improvement in cross-sectoral integrated analysis, strategy for mentoring lower LGs, inclusions of indirect cost of investments, increased attention to poverty focus, inclusion of NGOs activities, improvement of project planning and budgeting, integration of lower LGs plans, and improvement in accessibility of information and transparency regarding the LG's planning and budgeting.
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5     The PPA includes water, primary education, primary health, feeder roads, and Agriculture extension.
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6     This is measured based on the specific out put to be produced by each department. For example Finance departments are to keep proper books of accounts and produce final accounts, Audit to submit quarterly audits, engineering to have quarterly schedules for supervision etc.
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7     Adherence to the good practices of public procurement procedures as stipulated in the LGs Tender Boards Rules and Regulations.
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8     Performance assessment is done retrospective, it is therefore lagging by one year from the minimum conditions assessment.
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9     The DDP-LGDP-PMU is currently working on appraisal criteria manuals to guide local councils for public investments and for activities in the agricultural sector, particularly in relation to the more difficult private-goods area. DDP-LGDP also has a 'negative list' of activities, which are not eligible for funding (e.g. income generating activities for LC3 councils).
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10     This is fund from the HPIC debt relieve which Government has decided to channel to certain specific areas which are considered crucial for poverty reduction.
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11     Calculations from DDP data on actual outputs in five Districts and their Sub-counties
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12     The PAF budget lines, from which the majority of conditional grants are sourced, are roughly equally financed from these three sources. However with donors financing over half the budget, the 'Government' contribution to the PAF is also partially donor financed.
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13     Draft Final Report on the PMA study.
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14     Nationally Government is targeting the construction of about 20,000 classrooms for primary schools with funding from DfID
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15     An Umbrella organisation of all the NGOs in Uganda.
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16     The PTC has about 12 members drawn from Ministry of Local Government, Ministry of Planning and Economic Development, Uganda Local Authority Association, Urban Authority Association of Uganda, Ministry of Gender Labour and Social Affairs, Private contractors, NGO Forum, Professional Engineers, Decentralisation Secretariat, PMU.
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