Uganda Working Brief Series
Insights from the District Development Project: Table of Contents
The Changing Responsibilities of Central Government
By Martin Onyach-Olaa and Doug Porter
Abstract
The national objectives adopted by the Constitution (1995) of the Republic of Uganda and the Local Government Act, 1997 underscore the democratic principles of encouraging and empowering the active participation of its citizens in their government. The Constitution and the LG Act, 1997 form the basis for several key good governance policies, the most important being the devolution and transfer of functions, responsibilities, and authority to lower levels of government.
The cumulative effect of these legislative reforms has been to change the basic responsibilities of central government and the fundamental relationships between the centre and Local Governments. Service delivery responsibility has been decentralised to Local Governments; however, ministries are required to inspect, monitor, offer technical advice, support supervision and training within their respective sectors (LG Act, 1997, Sec. 97) to ensure the effective implementation of national policies and standards by Local Governments.
Despite achievements registered to date in the implementation of the policy reform, there two fundamental challenges: the lack of capacity of central government to cope with its new mandate; and the delayed development of common policies and modalities for the decentralisation of the development budget. This includes practical measures for decentralising a number of conditional, donor-funded projects as well as a complete change in planning and budgeting procedures of central ministries. Unconditional grant transfers from the centre are inadequate to cover administrative costs, plus the little development money that has been transferred is highly conditional thus leaving local governments with little discretionary powers to plan and allocate for improved service delivery according to the local context.
The implementation of the District Development Programme (DDP) not only exposed the limited capacities within Local Governments to provide the decentralised services, but also the lack of capacity of central government ministries to respond to their new responsibilities. Central government officials have not yet come to terms with their new mandates. The response by central government to the new demands by Local Governments has not been sufficient or very effective.
Introduction
1.1 Decentralisation in Uganda
In 1992 the Government of Uganda announced the decentralisation policy that led to the local government (Resistance Council) Statue in 1993. This provided for the transfer of powers and resources to Local Governments. Subsequently, the Constitution 1995 and the LG Act, 1997 further entrenched the principles of decentralisation in Uganda. These policy reforms changed the relationships between the centre and Local Governments. It empowered Local Governments with responsibilities for integrated participatory planning, budgeting and investment management. Now Local Governments have the discretionary powers:
- To hire and
fire staff (LG Act, Sec. 53),
- To elect representatives
to govern their affairs
(LG Act, Sec 117 – 1380),
- To approve their
own budgets without reference to the centre
(LG Act, Sec. 78),
- To collect and
retain tax (LG Act, Fifth Schedule), and
- To initiate and execute socio-economic development plans (LG Act, Sec 36 (3)).
The second schedule of the Act has delineated functions and services to be provided by central and Local Governments. Service delivery, which was hitherto the responsibility of central ministries, has been decentralised to Local Governments. Under the Act (Sec. 97), the central government’s new mandate is to provide policy guidance and performance standards (service delivery standards) to Local Governments. It can inspect, monitor, offer technical advice, support supervision, and provide training to Local Governments. This is a major shift in responsibilities between central and local governments in Uganda.
However, central government is yet to significantly increase the scope for local decisions about service delivery and development funds, partly because it is not convinced about Local Governments’ capacity to perform and use resources wisely; and partly because it sees the devolution of funds to Local Governments as a loss of power. Our intention in this Brief is to shift the current preoccupation with local government capacity toward a more balanced assessment of the capacities required at both the levels of central and the local governments. The Brief reflects on how central government is coping with its changed responsibilities; how it is responding to its new mandate; and how this response is affecting the performance of Local Governments in service delivery. Experiences shall be drawn from the implementation of the District Development Project Pilot (DDP), which is providing discretionary development grants to Local Governments in five Districts of Uganda.
1.2 The District Development Project Pilot (DDP)
In 1995, the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) and the International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank entered into a negotiation with the Government of Uganda to pilot the decentralisation of discretionary development budget support to Local Governments. The design of the programme took two years due to the extensive consultation process with a number of local government stakeholders (e.g., central government, Local Governments, NGOs, private sector agencies and community members). The DDP piloted this process starting in 1997. A budget of US$15 million was approved for the implementation of the programme over a period of four years. The five districts identified to benefit from the pilot were Kotido, Jinja, Arua, Kabale, and Mukono. They were chosen to ensure a wide representation of the country’s socio-economic and environmental conditions as well as disparities in Local Government capacity, infrastructure endowment, and service delivery standards.
2.0 DDP Implementation Evaluations
The monitoring and evaluation design of the DDP includes a bi-annual assessment that is carried out in November/December and May/June. The November/December assessment is a mid-term monitoring exercise to ensure that programme implementation is on course and corrective measures to solve problem are taken in time. The May/June assessment is intended to review performance. The outputs of the performance review are used for rewarding good performers and sanctioning poor ones.
2.1 The Assessment Process
The assessment process involved four steps:
Step 1: Preparation and refinement of the assessment manual of minimum conditions and performance measure for Local Governments by detailing the assessment process, procedures, information sources, checklists and reporting formats.
Step 2: Internal assessment by the district of all its sub-counties by a multi-disciplinary team constituted by the District Resource Team (the District Technical Planning Committee), which is trained by the Ministry of Local Government (MoLG).
Step 3: National assessment by a multi-disciplinary National Assessment Team that was trained before the assessment by the MoLG.
Step 4: Reporting through the sharing, discussion, review, analysis, and progressive compilation of reports.
Since the project launch in July 1997, there have been two mid-term monitoring assessments and two performance assessments of the programme implementation. These results revealed some interesting patterns. First, there has been a profound improvement in local government compliance and performance compared to the situation observed at the time of the formulation of the DDP. During formulation of the programme in 1996, less than 20% of Local Governments would have met the access conditions. In contrast, although many Local Governments did not meet the minimum conditions in June 1999, in most cases this was due to failure on very few indicators, such as maintenance of specific books of accounts.
This high standard can be attributed to the participatory formulation process that was built on existing Local Government practices and regulations. The participatory formulation process resulted in an unusual degree of “buy-in” by councils to the overall programme since it did not require special arrangements or by-pass Local Government systems. These results demonstrate the fact that the improvement of capacities, procedures and skills at Local Governments need to be accompanied by real, discretionary resources for investment to Local Governments. The assessment findings made a number of recommendations to be acted upon by Local Governments, central government and donors. Since the intention f the paper is to concentrate on the changing role of central government under decentralisation, we will limit our analysis of the assessment findings and recommendations to the central government.
2.2 Assessment Findings and the Role of Central Government
The first evaluation review of the DDP on local government performance, during November 1998, listed a number of recommendations that had direct bearing on the role of central governments under the decentralisation policy framework. In the past, the central government was the main service provider while Local Governments were largely the recipients. Now central government is required to provide quality assurance while the Local Governments are the service providers in consultation with their constituencies. The major recommendations are found below.
Role Conceptualisation
Many officials at the central government level understand their changing
relationship with the local governments in terms of accountability (i.e.,
Local Governments accountability to central government). A growing number
readily admit that decentralisation depends on a “strong centre”
that is capable of providing policy guidance, mentoring, and technical
support, supervision and interdiction. However, what seems to be missing
is the recognition of the accountability of Local Governments, i.e.,
their ability and willingness to comply with regulations and to perform
well in the spirit of decentralisation, depends on the accountability
of central agencies. In other words, the central government’s readiness
and ability to meet their obligations to Local Governments.
Finance and
Conditionality
While Local Governments prepare and pass their own budgets without reference
to the centre, they argue that each year the portion of the budget available
for discretionary allocations to local priorities is diminishing. Locally
raised revenue (local taxes, licenses, and market dues) seldom meet
more than 30% of the local government budget requirements. Transfers
from the central government are increasingly made through conditional
grants tied to centrally dictated priorities and not to locally identified
needs. Building capacity in inclusive local government planning must
be accompanied by sufficient discretionary funds to respond to locally
identified needs, otherwise it reduces the local government planning
process to an unnecessary activity.
Communication
The MoLG has produced and distributed a wide range of guidelines and
manuals concerning Local Government roles and responsibilities. However,
lack of information, rather than a lack of willingness, was the reason
given by many Local Governments, contractors or community groups for
not complying with approved practices. The problem identified during
the assessments was the absence of an appropriate communication strategy
by the MoLG. It was recommended that the MoLG should further develop
its communication strategy in order to improve compliance.
Integrated
Planning and Participatory Approaches
Section 36 of the LG Act, 1997 requires districts to prepare a three-year
rolling development plan incorporating plans of lower level Local Governments.
While Local Governments have made great improvements in the quality
of district and lower level LG planning and allocation, over the years
line ministries have issued guidelines for preparing development plans
for their sectors contrary to the provision of the Act. Donors have
done the same for their funded programmes. These planning guides have
been confusing to Local Governments. The review recommended that the
MoLG harmonise these various guides into one document.
Compliance
with Regulations and Standards
Line ministries have the role of compliance supervision (LG Act 1997,
Sec. 97); therefore, they are required to ensure Local Governments meet
service standards both in terms of design and delivery. Local Governments
find it difficult to deal with the confusing and little understood range
of standards that currently exist for service delivery. These standards
range from construction and building standards to appropriate service
coverage arrangements. Nonetheless, a remarkable improvement in compliance
with financial and tender regulations has been observed [DDP report
on the assessment of minimum conditions and performance measures, June
1999].
During the 1998, the MoLG was urged to give a clear determination of the implications of the failure to observe existing standards and regulations for the use of public funds. A range of actions within the responsibility of MoLG was identified as part of a general effort to improve local government accountability and their awareness of the rules and the consequences for ignoring them.
Appraisal
Format for Local Government Investments
It was recommended that the MoLG, in consultation with Local Governments,
should urgently develop simple techniques to increase Local Governments
capacities in prioritising and appraising their investments. This appraisal
format was to include considerations such as social desirability, technical
feasibility, financial viability, supervision arrangements, recurrent
cost implications, regulatory approval (if any), and technical approval
in terms of detailed design, work plans, and financial plans. This recommendation
was made in light of the fact that Local Governments do not have a standard
format of issues to subject their investment proposal against before
financing such investments. The evaluation exercise found that some
investment decisions were being driven purely by political considerations
and it is unlikely they will be sustainable.
The second monitoring and evaluation review conducted in November/December 1999 noted that the central government has not responded to any of the 1998 recommendations. Despite the lack of response, the monitoring and evaluation review made another important recommendation on the role of the Local Governments in the productive sector and actions to be taken by central government to enable Local Governments to make public investments in production. The review found that in some districts, Local Governments are aware of their roles and responsibilities in the productive sector as that of supporting and enabling.
Nevertheless, some Districts are not enthusiastic about investing in the production sector because there is a gap between understanding their production roles and then understanding how to take the necessary steps to actualise the goals. The review concluded that:
a) There are no clear criteria for the identification of investments in the productive sector. Most districts and sub-counties regard the productive sector as a priority but do not have development objectives related to the sector, though some are related to poverty alleviation or food security.
b) Local Governments do not have a robust appraisal process in the productive sector and little direction from the central government.
c) There is a lack of local government technical capacity in the productive sector.
The points above are illustrative of around 30 separate, practical and implementable recommendations made to central government. The fact that central government agencies accepted these recommendations at national forum but did not take action is a manifestation of the limited capacity at the centre to respond to its changed responsibility to Local Governments.
2.3 Lessons on Centre—Local Relationships
Decentralisation policy recognises the importance of relations between the centre and local governments. The LG Act 1997 emphasises, in addition to the ‘policy guidance’ role of the Centre, the key role of line ministries in supervision and mentoring, auditing, and interdicting transgressions of the law. In other words, the Centre is seen to have a prime responsibility to ensure and encourage the accountability of Local Governments, not to deliver services.
Two key lessons emerged as results of the DDP assessments. First, it is clear that line ministries can no longer order Local Governments around because of the non-subordination clause found in the LG Act, 1997. Their new role should be to mentor and ensure service delivery quality, yet they need to develop new capacities and skills to meet these new obligations to Local Governments.
Second, Uganda’s donor partners have paid little attention to supporting line ministries to meet their new obligations under decentralisation. This will have serious implications for the next stage of decentralisation – the devolution of development funds to Local Governments. Most donors acknowledge that there is a serious gap between functional responsibilities and current capacity in some line ministries; yet, there are few instances where donors go beyond recognition that a problem exists to seriously looking at how they might support the Centre as part of their overall commitment to Uganda’s decentralisation. For most, decentralisation means working at the district level and they have been reluctant to get involved in strengthening the capacity of central ministries to deliver on their obligations. Inadvertently, donors are performing central government functions and, in the process, sometimes introducing procedures that contradict the laws and regulations of the Ugandan government.
3.0 Conclusions
In many respects, Uganda is privileged by its clear statutory and policy framework for decentralisation. However, the latest challenge is to break down the structural rigidities found within central governments. Central government staff has not fully come into terms with its changing roles under decentralisation. Some line ministries still believe that it is their prerogative to decide which sectors Local Governments should invest in and by how much. Nevertheless, the Local Governments participating in the DDP are demonstrating that provided a clear frame exists for incentives, sanctions, and performance assessment from the centre, they have the capacity to deliver on their statutory mandates as Local Governments.
It would seem apparent that failures of decentralisation policy in Uganda could be linked to the failure of the central government to respond effectively, efficiently, and timely to its new responsibility as prescribed under law. The centre has no role in direct service delivery so it should quickly transform itself from a provider into a mentor and supervisor for local government service delivery. The DDP implementation evaluations for the last two years have demonstrated that the slow pace at which central governments upgrade their conduct and systems to support their new roles for good governance can fundamentally compromise the performances of Local Governments.
