UNCDF Working Paper
Policy & Institutional Analysis & Programming
Strategies
Annexe Note 2
Guidelines for Institutional Assessment
This aims to serve as guide for UNCDF Programming and Project preparation.
A. Assessing the National Decentralisation Context
1. Institutional Framework
2. Political Impetus in Favour of Decentralisation
B. Assessment of Local Government in the Project Area
1. Legal Basis
2. Composition & Political Representation
3. Functional Mandate
4. Size of Jurisdiction
5. Staff
6. Finance
7. Legislating Powers and Dispute Resolution
8. Internal Organisation
A. Assessing the National Decentralisation Context
This involves assessing two related dimensions:
- the overall Institutional Framework of state institutions at regional and local levels and
- the state and direction of government policy and commitment to empowering these institutions. (Return)
The exact pattern of local government and administration in any given LDC derives from traditional local authority institutions, usually overlaid by institutions imposed during the colonial experience, and further moulded by subsequent political developments. Consequently, the formal and constitutional structures of local government and administration vary greatly – only in rare cases will these come close to the ideal-type of local government characterised in the Box below.
|
It is worthwhile to summarise the typical features of two contrasting stereotypes of "local state institution": Devolution: "Local Government" This represents a stereotype (or "ideal type") to which in reality no local government will ever fully correspond, even in Western liberal democracies, but which provide a useful framework for assessment and for comparison over time and between countries. Briefly these features are:
It is generally believed that these features are key to achieving efficient and locally accountable service provision, and the related benefits of democratic governance. Deconcentration: "Local Administrative Committees" By contrast, an institution of deconcentrated Local Administration is generally characterised as follows:
Both sets of institution frequently co-exist at either the same or different levels. |
A first task of assessment then is to map out the local institutional topography as defined by the Constitution, and by legal statutes, administrative decree, or simply by practice, to determine how close or how distant from this ideal type are the institutions at each level. Issues to be explored are:
- the formally defined "levels" of government and administration from Region/Province, through District/Prefecture, County/Arrondissement, Comune/Ward, to village;
- the existence of centrally appointed general administrators (Governors, Prefects, District commissioners, etc.) at these levels;
- the existence of elected (or part elected/part appointed) policy-making or consultative assemblies (councils, assemblies, development committees, etc.), their legal/constitutional status, areas of jurisdiction, and their relationship with centrally appointed administrators (one supervising the other, or mere consultation between?);
- the deployment and employment of executive or line dept. staff, their geographical area of operations, & their relationships (control, joint supervision, or simply coordination?) with general administrators, with representative assemblies, and with their own parent ministries;
- Central Ministries responsible for local administration and government, and the nature of central-local relations ("tutelle" and supervision, inspection and audit, or monitoring & mentoring).
This assessment should therefore identify Administrative and Representative institutions at each level, their role, powers and functions, and the cross-relations of control across institutions at each level and between institutions at different levels.
The Box below aims to summarise the issues to be examined:
|
|
|
|
| Central | Key Oversight & Support Ministries & Agencies – Ministries of Local Government/ Interior; Planning/Finance; LG Civil Service Ministry/ Commission; Auditor-General; LG Finance Commission, etc. What roles? Do they support, control or supervise? | National Parliament – any indirect local government/ mayoral representation? Parliamentary committees on local government/finance? |
|
|
1. Appointed Governor? 2. Line Departments? 3. Line Department Coordinating/ Development Committee? Role? Does 1. Control or merely coordinate 2. & 3? Does central funding transit entirely throough 2 or some through 3? | Representative Council? Basis? Indirect representation from lower tiers? Status, range of functions, staff, financing, etc? Controlled by, advisory to, or independent of Governor/ Commissioner? Control, dual supervision, or merely coordination with Line Depts.? |
|
|
1. Appointed Prefect/D.C.? 2. Line Departments? 3. Line Department Coordinating/ Development Committee? Role? Does 1 control or merely coordinate 2 & 3? Does central funding transit entirely through 2, or some through 3? | Representative Council? Basis? Supervision or independence from tier 1? Indirect representation from lower tiers? Status, range of functions, staff, financing, etc.? Controlled by, advisory to, or independent of Prefect/D.C.? Control, dual supervision, or merely coordination with Line Depts.? |
|
|
Locally deployed line staff? Links with local council/committee? Appointed headman? | Village/Ward councils/ committees? Basis? Role? Links with higher levels? Links to headman? Local chiefs? |
| NOTE – Levels are notional and, for example, might be Province/District/Ward or Region/ Departement/ Commune/ Village. | ||
It may emerge that at any given level there are significant differences in constitutional or legal provisions for urban areas, which in many countries enjoy more autonomous representative government than do the rural areas. Indeed, in a number of countries rural areas enjoy no representative organs at all, except perhaps at the village level, or at least none with anything more than advisory or consultative functions. (Return)
2. Political Impetus in Favour of Decentralisation
But mapping the formal structures is of course not the whole story. There are cases of countries with a formal system which appears devolutionary, but where this has been emptied through political undermining of the formal/constitutional provisions, in favour of re-centralisation of control (e.g. Malawi under Banda, or Kenya until recently); and, conversely, there are cases where within a formal system which, for historical reasons, does not feature classic local government structures, but where the government may still be pressing a policy of greater democratic decentralisation (as in Mali). Ultimately, of course, such commitments may themselves in turn lead to reform of the constitutionally defined "formal structures" discussed above.
Decentralising Resources & Powers: Policies & Trends
In other words, independently of the formal institutional patterns, government policies toward "decentralisation" of authority and resource control can be more or less committed – and more or less static - as regards the:
- extent of local democratic control (by representative bodies) allowed over the local administration;
- extent to which "institutional linkages" are being created between local authorities and the public;
- assignment of development functions (typically, rural roads, primary health, education, water, etc.) to the authority, and the extent to which the local authority is being made fully responsible rather than being merely consultative;
- assignment of revenue raising (& retaining) powers to the authority;
- establishing a mechanism for central-local fiscal transfers (revenue sharing, grants);
- extent of final discretionary authority allowed to the local political authority in:
- setting local planning/development objectives for their assigned functions,
- allocating budgetary resources for these functions,
- staffing control for these functions, etc..
Central-Local Relationships: Procedures & Practices
Finally, and critically, there is need to assess the more routine nature of the central-local relationship: does the centre empower or frustrate local government? Of course, this is a cross-cutting theme which runs through many of the issues highlighted in the preceding sections, and the conclusions will usually be ambiguous. Nonetheless, some key questions to consider in an overall assessment are:
- Are central representatives involved in local council activities or decisions?
- Is the centre involved in appointing or approving key local government civil servants?
- Does the centre insist on approving local authority plans and budgets at the beginning of the year?
- Are changes made to local plans and budgets and on what basis?
- Does the centre fully earmark use of funds transferred or allow some local discretion?
In summary here it must be said that there are few LDCs – indeed few countries anywhere - where the centre really empowers local government. What is probably most important is to identify changes and trends in the relationship, and to identify aspects where improvements are taking place, and to highlight inconsistencies between declared policy, formal legislation and practice.
A key aim of this stage in the assessment is therefore to identify trends or commitments to decentralising such powers or resources to the representative bodies identified under 1.. Specific attention should of course be given to any recent or pending legislation, or to any deliberative Commissions or Taskforces charged with formulating recommendations under any of the above heads.
Identifying Allies & Stakeholders
National governments are not monolithic. The assessment should therefore identify those parts of central government who are particularly interested to promote decentralisation of powers and resources to local bodies, while also identifying those departments which, for whatever reason, argue against. Rather paradoxically, the Ministries with formal responsibility for decentralised administration or local government are not always those most favourable to devolution of powers (eg. Nepal and Bhutan, where the lead is being taken by the National Planning authorities rather than the Home Affairs Ministries supervising local authorities).
There may also be other key allies: e.g. the National Association of Local Authorities, key NGOs, Parliamentary committees on Local Government. (Return)
B. Assessment of Local Government in the Project Area
CDF policy is to focus primarily on those levels of the state most closely corresponding to local government, following the country analysis of the sort outlined above under A; but CDF has learnt that local governments vary enormously.
|
|
As this contrast suggests, there are very different institutions in LDCs passing as "local government", varying greatly in capacity, accountability, viability and legitimacy. CDF experience points to the need to assess a range of issues – both problems and opportunities - in preparation for project strategy and design. (Return)
A first issue concerns the legal basis for the local authority. Other things equal, enshrinement of the role and powers of local government in the Constitution (the Ugandan case) is a stronger safeguard for autonomy and sustainability than a basis in Parliamentary legislation, which can be easily revoked (the Bangladesh case), which in turn is stronger than mere basis in Ministerial decree (the Cambodian case). Whatever the legal basis, the clearer the definition of the functions and powers of the local authority, the better.
Possession or absence by local bodies of legal corporate status has major implications, and distinguishes "local government" from "local administration". The practical implications of this issue are further spelt out in Annexe Note 1. Discussion in the following sections focusses principally on institutions of local government. (Return)
2. Composition & Political Representation
A key issue concerns the legitimacy, representativeness and local accountability of the political council or assembly. Is it wholly elected or partly appointed (appointees usually feeling mainly accountable to their appointors), and, if elected, through some reasonably competitive and fair political process? The following are some specific issues which have arisen:
- Role of traditional authorities. Local accountability can still be maintained when some members of the body are non-elected traditional leaders, if they are perceived as legitimate representatives (e.g. under the former Malawian regime, in the north Traditional chiefs played an important representational role on District councils; elsewhere they were believed to have been bought off by the MCP and had lost credibility);
- Party systems. Some degree of local accountability can also still be maintained even when political activity is dominated by a single party if pre-election candidate selection is reasonably competitive (as is now reportedly the case with the Tanzanian CCM) or if the party maintains local credibility and grassroots service ethos (as in the Eritrean EFDJ or the Vietnamese CP, in the Centre/North). Conversely, even in a multi-party system, central party nomination of candidates can undermine local choice and accountability (see Senegal).
- Direct election of Council Chairpersons or Mayors. While direct democracy might argue in favour of this (rather than indirect election of leaders by Council itself), there are risks that their disproportionate electoral mandate allows these leaders to dominate affairs (as with Union Parishad chairpersons in Bangladesh) or indeed to enter into destructive rivalry with elected national parliamentarians from the same area.
- Members of Parliament. The ex-ufficio involvement of national-level MPs in local government bodies is almost always a distorting influence (see Malawi and Bangladesh), tending to cater to local elite and factional interests, or national party concerns, much more than do local government councillors.
- Quotas. Many local political bodies provide for quotas for women (Bangladesh) or "minority" groups (e.g. scheduled castes in India, or youth and handicapped in Uganda). This is obviously valuable, but can be problematic, especially if representatives are simply appointed (reinforcing local patronage mechanisms), unless there are carefully designed mechanisms for competitive election for reserved seats.
- "Residency" Biases. Residency requirements may exclude political participation by people with a legitimate stake in local affairs – e.g. seasonal migrants or pastoralists. Here there may be need to provide compensating mechanisms for representation or consultation. (Return)
LDFs aim to finance local public goods and services - typically, roads, health, education, water/sanitation, irrigation, and power, etc. - but in any given LDC the mandate or competency of local government may be broad or narrow, and clear or vague, and may or may not encompass this range of activities. (3) While some LDCs have adopted a "general competency" principle, allowing wide latitude and initiative to local government (though rarely matched by resources), other LDCs have imitated the more restrictive ultra vires principle (by which local governments may undertake only those functions expressly allowed by the centre). Specific issues to look for are:
- Range - the range of mandated or permissive functions or sectors assigned to local government, and existence of ultra vires restrictions
- Basis of assignment - the legal basis and permanency of assignment of these functions (enshrined in legal statute, or in more easily reversible decrees, administrative circulars, etc.)
- Clarity - the clarity of functions as related to definitions of infrastructure & service categories. Illustratively, a responsibility for "primary education" may encompass anything from school maintenance, to new school construction, to payment of teachers’ salaries, to teacher recruitment, to school inspection, and to definition of policy issues such as school building standards, acceptable pupil:teacher ratios, or school fee requirements, and, ultimately, to designing the curriculum ! CDF experience is that these are rarely satisfactorily defined.
- Overlap & Conflict - possible overlaps with assigned functions of other government agencies or tiers (as in Tanzania between District Councils and Regional administrations; or in Nepal between some functions of the DDCs, under the Local Government legislation, and those of the District line departments, as under Ministerial decrees still extant).
- Agency Functions - finally, it is important to identify special functions which have been delegated to local governments as agents of central government (eg management of technical colleges and hospitals by Ugandan District councils), but which allow no local discretion in planning and resource allocation.
CDF experience is that unclarity or overlap of function leads to either conflict, duplication of effort or inaction by all sides, and certainly undermines the accountability of local government. (Assignment of functions, clear or vague, without commensurate funding is of course another major source of problems – see Finance below.)
The extent to which Local Governments can reasonably be expected to assume their mandated or permitted responsibilities will depend very much on 3 further sets of issues: Size of Jurisdiction, Staff and Financing. (Return)
The geographic area and the population of local government jurisdictions are important for several reasons.
Service Provision Viability. A larger area or population allows or compels the local government to "internalise" a greater range of externalities and spillover effects in its decision-making, and so will justify:
- More obviously, a broader range of infastructure and service planning responsibilities – secondary as well as primary education; feeder roads as well as access tracks; etc.
- Less often noted, a greater depth of planning and policy competence within each service – decisions on new school investments and not just operation and maintenance of existing schools; etc..
Thus Ugandan Districts (popn usually over 500,000) can legitimately be entrusted with a far broader sectoral range and depth of planning competence than can a Malian comune (popn 15,000) or Bangladeshi Union Parishad (diameter 3-5 kms), for reasons independent of their respective technical and financial planning resources or of their mandated or permitted functions.
Participation & Accountability. However, the CDF view is that the "viability of planning units" or "economies of scale" in service provision can be overstated, and also may conflict with political participation, communication and pressures for accountability, which can be greater in smaller areas. Partly in recognition of this, in Uganda there is now effort to devolve some service provision responsibilities from Districts to smaller sub-county levels.
Ultimately, the larger the local government unit area or population, the fewer the units required, and the greater staff and financial resources which can reasonably be assigned to local governments and the closer monitoring, support and control which can be exercised. (Return)
If a local authority is to undertake planning and management infrastructure and service delivery it obviously needs an "executive" capacity for this – elected councilors are generally part time, and are not (necessarily) technically qualified for such tasks. There are very great variations in local government access to or control of locally deployed civil servants. There are several issues to be looked at:
Access. The most immediate question is whether there are any staff to hand at all, that the authority can call on. Usually, even small authorities have some sort of clerk or secretary at their disposal, for very basic administrative functions. Larger authorities may have their own core Planning, Finance and Works officers, and even a whole range of line departments, mirroring central ministries. The extent of such access clearly determines the range of activities that the authority can undertake. To a degree, local authorities may be able to compensate by turning to outside sources of expertise (by hiring consultants or NGOs) but while these may act as "agents" they can rarely replace the role of permanent executive staff which any "principal" requires.
Coordination, Supervision or Control. But the "proximity" of such staff may not ensure real access to their services. It is therefore key to determine their relationship with the local authority. A few "core staff" are often employed directly by and so are at the full disposal of the local authority. In rare cases (such as Uganda, and perhaps soon in Malawi) the whole panoply of local line department staff is also employed directly by the authority. It is much more usual, however, for line staff to be in the employ of parent ministries, with the local government enjoying some greater or lesser degree of "dual supervision" or coordination – but staff loyalties and their sense of accountability will inevitably be to head office rather than to local councilors. The extent of such real control is therefore also a determinant of local government capacity for autonomous action.
Political Appointments. In Nicaragua, as elsewhere in Latin America, senior local civil servants are appointed by the majority party after election victory. This clearly affects the workings and continuity of the local executive and, more pragmatically, must be recognised in the cycle of training and capacity building activities.
Local Government Civil Service Cadre. The quality, career incentives and perhaps the morale of local government civil servants will probably be enhanced where they are part of a specific local government corps, which regulates their conditions of service and protects their interests. However, there appear to be no cases of such arrangements in the LDCs where CDF is operating. (Return)
Local governments must finance their service activities through (a) locally-raised revenues and (b) from funds transferred from the centre or from other tiers of government. The adequacy of these financing arrangements is central to local government capacity and viability, and their design is also key to accountability.
Local Revenue Mobilisation
Local governments in rural areas in LDCs have typically an inherently very weak tax base – which, in comparison to urban or national tax base, by its nature is (a) unresponsive to growth in local economic activity and (b) is both expensive and politically hard to collect. It is important to ascertain just how problematic this issue is – and what scope there is to improve performance and efficiency - by examining the following questions:
Tax Sources allowed to local government. There is a range of questions to be explored and which may form the basis of policy dialogue with central government:
- Range and variety. A wider variety of sources provides a less vulnerable tax base.
- Legal basis for tax assignment. It is important to determine whether local governments are mandated to collect particular taxes or can themselves decide which sources they wish to exploit.
- Buoyancy & variability. The extent to which the assigned tax bases adjust to changes in population, inflation, and real income – or remain stagnant - should be gauged.
- Discretion in setting tax rates. Very often local governments must seek central approval to adjust local tax rates, which approval is often withheld arbitrarily, discouraging local initiative and ensuring that tax revenues lag far behind inflation.
- Discretion in using tax proceeds. Finally, there may be questions around the freedom with which local governments may use the proceeds of particular sources of tax revenue – the less the discretion, again, the lesser the chance for local accountability.
Tax Collection Performance. A further range of questions relate more directly to local revenue administration capacities, and may be areas where technical support can be provided (through training, simple computer data-base systems, etc.):
- Tax registers & assessments. Usually local governments have difficulty in maintaining an updated register of taxable households, businesses, lands or properties, and so are unable to exploit the taxable potential of the area; or in computing the annual assessment of household or business incomes or property values, and so calculating due taxes.
- Mode of collection. How are tax payers notified and who collects? If tax collection and assessment is done by the same person (as in many LDCs) there is greater scope for collusion and abuse.
- Collection costs and efficiency. What are the costs of collection, and are they significantly less than tax proceeds?
- Tax Revenue Monitoring. How does local government track the monthly progress in tax revenue collection, compare it with targets, and take corrective action where required?
- Enforcement. What are the procedures to bill taxpayers, notify defaulters and to compel payment of tax arrears?
Service Charges & Cost-Recovery Mechanisms. There is often considerable unexploited potential for raising revenues from the users of specific services (water, education, markets, etc.) through some system of user fees. Local authorities usually have greater latitude in this, as compared to taxation per se, but are sometimes hesitant because of real or perceived conflicts with national service provision policies, and because of fears of local resistance (which can often be overcome by careful information dissemination, and the issuing of accounts explaining how revenues were used.)
Central-Local Transfers
Nowhere in the world are local governments financially independent of central government (other than the SE provinces of China where net fiscal transfers actually flow to the centre). Particularly in LDCs, the political economy is such that the bulk of national tax revenues are levied on the types of transactions (eg international trade) or incomes (corporate or formal sector), that can only be collected centrally. Local level public expenditures in predominantly rural areas will therefore continue to be financed predominantly by fiscal transfers from the centre which are required to compensate for this "fiscal gap" – the references occasionally to attaining local government fiscal self-sufficiency are absurdly unrealistic, at least in rural areas. Further, there is no automatic relation between the degree of fiscal reliance on the centre and local autonomy – the real issue is the terms by which central financing is provided. Issues to be examined are the existence of or interest in:
Tax Revenue Sharing Arrangements. In some rare cases in LDCs a fixed share (even all) of a national tax is remitted to local government – either through some formula (being thus a variant of a central grant) or on the basis of area derivation (constituting greater collection incentives, if collected by local government, and somewhat enhancing scope for accountability, but generally inequitable). A variation of this is allowance that local authorities add a surcharge to locally collected national taxes.
Central Grants. It is important to examine any existing central grant-funding of local government (rural or urban), and past experiences, since the development of a grant mechanism is after all the strategic objective of all LDFs. Issues to examine are:
- Volume and annual variability
- Degree of Discretion or Conditionality in using the grants – inter-sectoral, intra-sectoral, "programmatic", or for specific local facilities or projects; only recurrent or also capital expenditure; etc.,
- Extent to which use of the grant is anyway pre-empted de facto by existing local expenditure commitments (typically, teachers’ salaries)
- Basis for allocation – formula-based, "gap-funding", or discretionary decisions by higher authorities; annual or multi-annual
- Use of matching approaches
- Procedures and timeliness for approval and release
Borrowing
The borrowing capacity of most rural local governments is non-existent and Local Government Loan Agencies are anyway largely defunct. Of more relevance is the ability of local governments to access overdraft facilities with local banks or government agencies to allow them to deal with monthly cash flow shortfalls, often resulting from seasonal tax revenue variations.
Financial Accountability
There is a broader political dimension and a narrower accounting dimension to financial accountability.
- Political Accountability for Use of Funds. These local pressures can only really kick in to the extent that local governments have made choices in raising or spending funds, through discretionary powers – and this may often be only partly the case;
- Accounting & Auditing. More simply, it is important to verify whether local authorities do produce accounts, whether they are satisfactory, whether they are properly inspected or audited, and whether any action is taken when problems are identified.
Finally, the extent to which local authorities do or might publish locally their budgets and accounts (at council offices, in markets, hospitals, the press, etc.) should be explored. (Return)
7. Legislating Powers and Dispute Resolution
It is important to establish the spheres within which local government may legislate through local by-laws (with penalties, fines, etc.), and the powers granted it to enforce compliance. Possession of such powers is important in determining local legitimacy and, specifically, to enabling direct or indirect involvement of local government in regulation and management of local common pool natural resources (forest areas, pastures, water bodies, etc.), whose degradation is often a result of failure of rule enforcement.
Without such powers, indeed, it will be more difficult for local authorities to manage or regulate any "common property infrastructure" (markets, ferries) which fall under its responsibility.
A related issue concerns the responsibility of local authorities in basic dispute resolution and adjudication. In many countries disputes over land, or spousal abuse, etc., constitute major local governance problems, especially for the poor and marginal groups in remote rural areas who have less chance of recourse to the formal justice system. If local governments (as is the case with Ugandan sub-counties) are formally empowered to intervene, this may constitute an important occasion for external support to enhance their effectiveness and legitimacy.
This is an area where there is much scope for further development of activities to promote improved local governance. (Return)
Local governments, as distinct from deconcentrated administrative committees, can be quite complex organisations, and their organisational structure requires some mapping out to better understand the potential and the likely constraints for introduction of modified and more rational planning, management and implementation systems, and greater accountability.
Council Leadership or Executive
Since the full Council will meet only quite rarely, routine business and leadership powers will generally be delegated to an executive authority. This is typically a Chairperson, voted by Council though in some cases he or directly elected. The accountability of such executive institutions needs some scrutiny, particularly where they are voted directly by constituents and thus may wield far greater power than regular Council members (as in Bangladesh or Uganda).
In larger Councils the Chairperson will generally be assisted by an Executive Committee – a small group of councilors, generally voted by Council, responsible for oversight of sectoral affairs.
Committee System
Standing Committees – comprised of selected councilors with key civil servants - are the key planning and management organs in local government systems derived from British tradition, and the main interface between local politicians and bureaucrats. It is important to assess how they function, how clear is their remit, how their deliberations are recorded, and how often they meet and how much participants’ allowances cost. Other things equal, regular, well attended and well documented meetings promise greater chance of adopting improved, accountable systems whose outcomes are regarded as legitimate. (There must also be some question as to the suitability of the committee system for managing regular business in large rural areas, with local councilors having to travel long distances on a regular basis to participate in meetings.)
Core Staff and Relations with Civil Servants
Effective working relations and trust between politicians and their key staff (Chief Officers, Planners, Finance Officers, Clerks ..), and accountability of the latter to the former, are of course very important. This issue should be probed, and warning indicators (a history of frequent staff turnover, disputes, firings, etc.) noted. The accountability of staff to local elected representatives is of course greater where they are hired and paid by the local authority.
Planning and Budgeting Systems
Where such systems exist, current prescribed procedures and practice should be understood. That is, in countries with a tradition of local government some form of basic planning and budgeting process and timetable will be in place. Clearly, any improved system should build on these, while aiming to link more closely, firstly, planning and budgeting and, secondly, capital budgeting and recurrent budgeting, too often undertaken by separate bodies with insufficient integration. Factors contributing to effective local planning should also be identified:
- clarity and consistency of local development priorities,
- consultative mechanisms between local authorities and communities, and between local authorities and technical line departments;
- adequacy of data availability (esp. from line departments), analysis and retrieval (incl. basic maps and population data);
- knowledge of funding resources available from various sources, and activities of projects or NGOs in the area;
- technical abilities to develop, vet, and cost proposals;
- abilities to appraise and rank competing proposals;
- abilities to set up workplans, budgets, etc..
Procurement Systems
Similarly, local governments will often be undertaking some procurement (materials, sub-contracting) with their current funds, and existing procedures and practices should be assessed, and constraints identified (typically, ceilings for local contract awards which have not been adjusted for inflation for many years, or overly complicated contract documents). It is useful to cross-check with local contractors.
Financial Management, Accounting & Control Systems
Finally, existing arrangements for internal financial management, accounting and control should be assessed to gauge whether expenditures are actually determined by budgets, how these are accounted for and monitored, how budgeted revenues are accounted for and monitored, what parties actually scrutinise the accounts (only the Finance Officer, or the Finance Committee, or the Council ..?), indeed how available accounts are for scrutiny, etc..
Relations with other Local Agencies
An essential dimension to local governance concerns the relations between local government and other local agencies (private, NGOs, community bodies, etc.) – whether they collaborate, compete, regulate and check each other, indeed whether they know anything about the activities of each other, etc.. Often – but not always - the relationships are shrouded in reciprocal ignorance and mistrust. Some measure of the degree and nature of interaction between local authorities and other local agencies is therefore important, with identification of the constraints to healthy interaction (perceived competition for funds by NGOs, suspected partiality of councilors to certain local firms, community bodies’ ignorance of council activities, etc.).
Relations with Central Government & Trends
Finally, and critically, there is need to assess the overall central-local relationship: does the centre empower or frustrate local government? Of course, this is a cross-cutting theme which runs through many of the issues highlighted in the preceding sections, and the conclusions will rarely be clear and unambiguous. Nonetheless, some key questions to consider in an overall assessment are:
- Are central representatives involved in local council activities or decisions?
- Is the centre involved in appointing or approving key local government civil servants?
- Does the centre insist on approving local authority plans and budgets at the beginning of the year?
- Are changes made to plans and budgets and on what basis?
- Does the centre fully earmark use of funds transferred or allow some local discretion?
It must be said that there are few LDCs - indeed few countries anywhere - where the centre really empowers local government. What is probably most important is to identify changes and trends in the relationship, and to identify aspects where improvements are taking place, and to highlight inconsistencies between declared policy, formal legislation and practice.
